examples: fix case typos in secret clearing paragraphs (s/, Or/, or/)
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@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int main(void) {
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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*
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*
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int main(void) {
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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*
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*
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ int main(void) {
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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*
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*
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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