Add ellswift usage example

This should hopefully be useful as orientation for users implementing
the key exchange part of BIP324. Conceptually the example is not very
different to the ECDH one, so a lot of code/comments are just copied
(e.g. context creation, secret key generation, shared secret comparison,
console output, cleanup with secret key clearing).
This commit is contained in:
Sebastian Falbesoner
2024-06-25 03:11:21 +02:00
parent fe4fbaa7f3
commit 31f84595c4
6 changed files with 143 additions and 0 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ctime_tests
ecdh_example ecdh_example
ecdsa_example ecdsa_example
schnorr_example schnorr_example
ellswift_example
*.exe *.exe
*.so *.so
*.a *.a

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@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
## [Unreleased] ## [Unreleased]
#### Added
- Added usage example for an ElligatorSwift key exchange.
## [0.5.0] - 2024-05-06 ## [0.5.0] - 2024-05-06
#### Added #### Added

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@@ -184,6 +184,17 @@ schnorr_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
endif endif
TESTS += schnorr_example TESTS += schnorr_example
endif endif
if ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
noinst_PROGRAMS += ellswift_example
ellswift_example_SOURCES = examples/ellswift.c
ellswift_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
ellswift_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
ellswift_example_LDFLAGS = -static
if BUILD_WINDOWS
ellswift_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
endif
TESTS += ellswift_example
endif
endif endif
### Precomputed tables ### Precomputed tables

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@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ Usage examples can be found in the [examples](examples) directory. To compile th
* [ECDSA example](examples/ecdsa.c) * [ECDSA example](examples/ecdsa.c)
* [Schnorr signatures example](examples/schnorr.c) * [Schnorr signatures example](examples/schnorr.c)
* [Deriving a shared secret (ECDH) example](examples/ecdh.c) * [Deriving a shared secret (ECDH) example](examples/ecdh.c)
* [ElligatorSwift key exchange example](examples/ellswift.c)
To compile the Schnorr signature and ECDH examples, you also need to configure with `--enable-module-schnorrsig` and `--enable-module-ecdh`. To compile the Schnorr signature and ECDH examples, you also need to configure with `--enable-module-schnorrsig` and `--enable-module-ecdh`.

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@@ -28,3 +28,7 @@ endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG) if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
add_example(schnorr) add_example(schnorr)
endif() endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
add_example(ellswift)
endif()

123
examples/ellswift.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
/*************************************************************************
* Written in 2024 by Sebastian Falbesoner *
* To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all *
* copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this *
* file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed *
* without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see *
* EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
*************************************************************************/
/** This file demonstrates how to use the ElligatorSwift module to perform
* a key exchange according to BIP 324. Additionally, see the documentation
* in include/secp256k1_ellswift.h and doc/ellswift.md.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <secp256k1.h>
#include <secp256k1_ellswift.h>
#include "examples_util.h"
int main(void) {
secp256k1_context* ctx;
unsigned char randomize[32];
unsigned char auxrand1[32];
unsigned char auxrand2[32];
unsigned char seckey1[32];
unsigned char seckey2[32];
unsigned char ellswift_pubkey1[64];
unsigned char ellswift_pubkey2[64];
unsigned char shared_secret1[32];
unsigned char shared_secret2[32];
int return_val;
/* Create a secp256k1 context */
ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
* leakage. See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
* information about it. This should never fail. */
return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
assert(return_val);
/*** Generate secret keys ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
break;
}
}
/* Generate ElligatorSwift public keys. This should never fail with valid context and
verified secret keys. Note that providing additional randomness (fourth parameter) is
optional, but recommended. */
if (!fill_random(auxrand1, sizeof(auxrand1)) || !fill_random(auxrand2, sizeof(auxrand2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey1, seckey1, auxrand1);
assert(return_val);
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift_pubkey2, seckey2, auxrand2);
assert(return_val);
/*** Create the shared secret on each side ***/
/* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey1 and ellswift_pubkey2. Should never fail
* with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. Note that both parties pass both
* EllSwift pubkeys in the same order; the pubkey of the calling party is
* determined by the "party" boolean (sixth parameter). */
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret1, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
seckey1, 0, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
assert(return_val);
/* Perform x-only ECDH with seckey2 and ellswift_pubkey1. Should never fail
* with a verified seckey and valid pubkey. */
return_val = secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(ctx, shared_secret2, ellswift_pubkey1, ellswift_pubkey2,
seckey2, 1, secp256k1_ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324, NULL);
assert(return_val);
/* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
assert(return_val == 0);
printf( " Secret Key1: ");
print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
printf( "EllSwift Pubkey1: ");
print_hex(ellswift_pubkey1, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey1));
printf("\n Secret Key2: ");
print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
printf( "EllSwift Pubkey2: ");
print_hex(ellswift_pubkey2, sizeof(ellswift_pubkey2));
printf("\n Shared Secret: ");
print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
/* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
*
* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
* will remove any writes that aren't used. */
secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
return 0;
}