mleku
7a27c44bc9
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Added extensive tests for default-permissive access control, read/write follow whitelists, and privileged-only fields. Updated policy documentation with new configuration examples, access control reference, and logging details.
2817 lines
96 KiB
Go
2817 lines
96 KiB
Go
package policy
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import (
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"bufio"
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"path/filepath"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/event"
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"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/hex"
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"github.com/adrg/xdg"
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"github.com/sosodev/duration"
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"lol.mleku.dev/chk"
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"lol.mleku.dev/log"
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"next.orly.dev/pkg/utils"
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)
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// parseDuration parses an ISO-8601 duration string into seconds.
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// ISO-8601 format: P[n]Y[n]M[n]DT[n]H[n]M[n]S
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// Examples: "P1D" (1 day), "PT1H" (1 hour), "P7DT12H" (7 days 12 hours), "PT30M" (30 minutes)
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// Uses the github.com/sosodev/duration library for strict ISO-8601 compliance.
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// Note: Years and Months are converted to approximate time.Duration values
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// (1 year ≈ 365.25 days, 1 month ≈ 30.44 days).
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func parseDuration(s string) (int64, error) {
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if s == "" {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("empty duration string")
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}
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s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
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if s == "" {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("empty duration string")
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}
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// Parse using the ISO-8601 duration library
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d, err := duration.Parse(s)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid ISO-8601 duration %q: %v", s, err)
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}
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// Convert to time.Duration and then to seconds
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timeDur := d.ToTimeDuration()
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return int64(timeDur.Seconds()), nil
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}
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// Kinds defines whitelist and blacklist policies for event kinds.
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// Whitelist takes precedence over blacklist - if whitelist is present, only whitelisted kinds are allowed.
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// If only blacklist is present, all kinds except blacklisted ones are allowed.
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type Kinds struct {
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// Whitelist is a list of event kinds that are allowed to be written to the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are denied.
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Whitelist []int `json:"whitelist,omitempty"`
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// Blacklist is a list of event kinds that are not allowed to be written to the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are allowed. Only takes effect in the absence of a Whitelist.
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Blacklist []int `json:"blacklist,omitempty"`
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}
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// Rule defines policy criteria for a specific event kind.
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//
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// Rules are evaluated in the following order:
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// 1. If Script is present and running, it determines the outcome
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// 2. If Script fails or is not running, falls back to default_policy
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// 3. Otherwise, all specified criteria are evaluated as AND operations
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//
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// For pubkey allow/deny lists: whitelist takes precedence over blacklist.
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// If whitelist has entries, only whitelisted pubkeys are allowed.
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// If only blacklist has entries, all pubkeys except blacklisted ones are allowed.
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type Rule struct {
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// Description is a human-readable description of the rule.
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Description string `json:"description"`
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// Script is a path to a script that will be used to determine if the event should be allowed to be written to the relay. The script should be a standard bash script or whatever is native to the platform. The script will return its opinion to be one of the criteria that must be met for the event to be allowed to be written to the relay (AND).
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Script string `json:"script,omitempty"`
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// WriteAllow is a list of pubkeys that are allowed to write this event kind to the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are denied.
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WriteAllow []string `json:"write_allow,omitempty"`
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// WriteDeny is a list of pubkeys that are not allowed to write this event kind to the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are allowed. Only takes effect in the absence of a WriteAllow.
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WriteDeny []string `json:"write_deny,omitempty"`
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// ReadAllow is a list of pubkeys that are allowed to read this event kind from the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are denied.
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ReadAllow []string `json:"read_allow,omitempty"`
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// ReadDeny is a list of pubkeys that are not allowed to read this event kind from the relay. If any are present, implicitly all others are allowed. Only takes effect in the absence of a ReadAllow.
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ReadDeny []string `json:"read_deny,omitempty"`
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// MaxExpiry is the maximum expiry time in seconds for events written to the relay. If 0, there is no maximum expiry. Events must have an expiry time if this is set, and it must be no more than this value in the future compared to the event's created_at time.
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// Deprecated: Use MaxExpiryDuration instead for human-readable duration strings.
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MaxExpiry *int64 `json:"max_expiry,omitempty"` //nolint:staticcheck // Intentional backward compatibility
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// MaxExpiryDuration is the maximum expiry time in ISO-8601 duration format.
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// Format: P[n]Y[n]M[n]W[n]DT[n]H[n]M[n]S (e.g., "P7D" for 7 days, "PT1H" for 1 hour, "P1DT12H" for 1 day 12 hours).
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// Parsed into maxExpirySeconds at load time.
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MaxExpiryDuration string `json:"max_expiry_duration,omitempty"`
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// MustHaveTags is a list of tag key letters that must be present on the event for it to be allowed to be written to the relay.
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MustHaveTags []string `json:"must_have_tags,omitempty"`
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// SizeLimit is the maximum size in bytes for the event's total serialized size.
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SizeLimit *int64 `json:"size_limit,omitempty"`
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// ContentLimit is the maximum size in bytes for the event's content field.
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ContentLimit *int64 `json:"content_limit,omitempty"`
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// Privileged means that this event is either authored by the authenticated pubkey, or has a p tag that contains the authenticated pubkey. This type of event is only sent to users who are authenticated and are party to the event.
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Privileged bool `json:"privileged,omitempty"`
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// RateLimit is the amount of data can be written to the relay per second by the authenticated pubkey. If 0, there is no rate limit. This is applied via the use of an EWMA of the event publication history on the authenticated connection
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RateLimit *int64 `json:"rate_limit,omitempty"`
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// MaxAgeOfEvent is the offset in seconds that is the oldest timestamp allowed for an event's created_at time. If 0, there is no maximum age. Events must have a created_at time if this is set, and it must be no more than this value in the past compared to the current time.
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MaxAgeOfEvent *int64 `json:"max_age_of_event,omitempty"`
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// MaxAgeEventInFuture is the offset in seconds that is the newest timestamp allowed for an event's created_at time ahead of the current time.
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MaxAgeEventInFuture *int64 `json:"max_age_event_in_future,omitempty"`
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// WriteAllowFollows grants BOTH read and write access to policy admin follows when enabled.
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// Requires PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled=true at the policy level.
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WriteAllowFollows bool `json:"write_allow_follows,omitempty"`
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// FollowsWhitelistAdmins specifies admin pubkeys (hex-encoded) whose follows are whitelisted for this rule.
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// Unlike WriteAllowFollows which uses the global PolicyAdmins, this allows per-rule admin configuration.
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// If set, the relay will fail to start if these admins don't have follow list events (kind 3) in the database.
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// This provides explicit control over which admin's follow list controls access for specific kinds.
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// DEPRECATED: Use ReadFollowsWhitelist and WriteFollowsWhitelist instead.
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FollowsWhitelistAdmins []string `json:"follows_whitelist_admins,omitempty"`
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// ReadFollowsWhitelist specifies pubkeys (hex-encoded) whose follows are allowed to READ events.
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// The relay will fail to start if these pubkeys don't have follow list events (kind 3) in the database.
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// When present, only the follows of these pubkeys (plus the pubkeys themselves) can read.
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// This restricts read access - without it, read is permissive by default (except for privileged events).
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ReadFollowsWhitelist []string `json:"read_follows_whitelist,omitempty"`
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// WriteFollowsWhitelist specifies pubkeys (hex-encoded) whose follows are allowed to WRITE events.
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// The relay will fail to start if these pubkeys don't have follow list events (kind 3) in the database.
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// When present, only the follows of these pubkeys (plus the pubkeys themselves) can write.
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// Without this, write permission is allowed by default.
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WriteFollowsWhitelist []string `json:"write_follows_whitelist,omitempty"`
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// TagValidation is a map of tag_name -> regex pattern for validating tag values.
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// Each tag present in the event must match its corresponding regex pattern.
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// Example: {"d": "^[a-z0-9-]{1,64}$", "t": "^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$"}
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TagValidation map[string]string `json:"tag_validation,omitempty"`
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// ProtectedRequired when true requires events to have a "-" tag (NIP-70 protected events).
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// Protected events signal that they should only be published to relays that enforce access control.
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ProtectedRequired bool `json:"protected_required,omitempty"`
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// IdentifierRegex is a regex pattern that "d" tag identifiers must conform to.
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// This is a convenience field - equivalent to setting TagValidation["d"] = pattern.
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// Example: "^[a-z0-9-]{1,64}$" requires lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens, max 64 chars.
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IdentifierRegex string `json:"identifier_regex,omitempty"`
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// Binary caches for faster comparison (populated from hex strings above)
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// These are not exported and not serialized to JSON
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writeAllowBin [][]byte
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writeDenyBin [][]byte
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readAllowBin [][]byte
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readDenyBin [][]byte
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maxExpirySeconds *int64 // Parsed from MaxExpiryDuration or copied from MaxExpiry
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identifierRegexCache *regexp.Regexp // Compiled regex for IdentifierRegex
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followsWhitelistAdminsBin [][]byte // Binary cache for FollowsWhitelistAdmins pubkeys (DEPRECATED)
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followsWhitelistFollowsBin [][]byte // Cached follow list from FollowsWhitelistAdmins (loaded at startup, DEPRECATED)
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// Binary caches for ReadFollowsWhitelist and WriteFollowsWhitelist
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readFollowsWhitelistBin [][]byte // Binary cache for ReadFollowsWhitelist pubkeys
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writeFollowsWhitelistBin [][]byte // Binary cache for WriteFollowsWhitelist pubkeys
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readFollowsFollowsBin [][]byte // Cached follow list from ReadFollowsWhitelist pubkeys
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writeFollowsFollowsBin [][]byte // Cached follow list from WriteFollowsWhitelist pubkeys
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}
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// hasAnyRules checks if the rule has any constraints configured
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func (r *Rule) hasAnyRules() bool {
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// Check for any configured constraints
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return len(r.WriteAllow) > 0 || len(r.WriteDeny) > 0 ||
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len(r.ReadAllow) > 0 || len(r.ReadDeny) > 0 ||
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len(r.writeAllowBin) > 0 || len(r.writeDenyBin) > 0 ||
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len(r.readAllowBin) > 0 || len(r.readDenyBin) > 0 ||
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r.SizeLimit != nil || r.ContentLimit != nil ||
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r.MaxAgeOfEvent != nil || r.MaxAgeEventInFuture != nil ||
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r.MaxExpiry != nil || r.MaxExpiryDuration != "" || r.maxExpirySeconds != nil || //nolint:staticcheck // Backward compat
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len(r.MustHaveTags) > 0 ||
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r.Script != "" || r.Privileged ||
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r.WriteAllowFollows || len(r.FollowsWhitelistAdmins) > 0 ||
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len(r.ReadFollowsWhitelist) > 0 || len(r.WriteFollowsWhitelist) > 0 ||
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len(r.readFollowsWhitelistBin) > 0 || len(r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin) > 0 ||
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len(r.TagValidation) > 0 ||
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r.ProtectedRequired || r.IdentifierRegex != ""
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}
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// populateBinaryCache converts hex-encoded pubkey strings to binary for faster comparison.
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// This should be called after unmarshaling the policy from JSON.
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func (r *Rule) populateBinaryCache() error {
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var err error
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// Convert WriteAllow hex strings to binary
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if len(r.WriteAllow) > 0 {
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r.writeAllowBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.WriteAllow))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.WriteAllow {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode WriteAllow pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.writeAllowBin = append(r.writeAllowBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Convert WriteDeny hex strings to binary
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if len(r.WriteDeny) > 0 {
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r.writeDenyBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.WriteDeny))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.WriteDeny {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode WriteDeny pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.writeDenyBin = append(r.writeDenyBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Convert ReadAllow hex strings to binary
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if len(r.ReadAllow) > 0 {
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r.readAllowBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.ReadAllow))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.ReadAllow {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode ReadAllow pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.readAllowBin = append(r.readAllowBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Convert ReadDeny hex strings to binary
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if len(r.ReadDeny) > 0 {
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r.readDenyBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.ReadDeny))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.ReadDeny {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode ReadDeny pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.readDenyBin = append(r.readDenyBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Parse MaxExpiryDuration into maxExpirySeconds
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// MaxExpiryDuration takes precedence over MaxExpiry if both are set
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if r.MaxExpiryDuration != "" {
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seconds, parseErr := parseDuration(r.MaxExpiryDuration)
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if parseErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to parse MaxExpiryDuration %q: %v", r.MaxExpiryDuration, parseErr)
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} else {
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r.maxExpirySeconds = &seconds
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}
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} else if r.MaxExpiry != nil { //nolint:staticcheck // Backward compatibility
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// Fall back to MaxExpiry (raw seconds) if MaxExpiryDuration not set
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r.maxExpirySeconds = r.MaxExpiry //nolint:staticcheck // Backward compatibility
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}
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// Compile IdentifierRegex pattern
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if r.IdentifierRegex != "" {
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compiled, compileErr := regexp.Compile(r.IdentifierRegex)
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if compileErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to compile IdentifierRegex %q: %v", r.IdentifierRegex, compileErr)
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} else {
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r.identifierRegexCache = compiled
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}
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}
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// Convert FollowsWhitelistAdmins hex strings to binary (DEPRECATED)
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if len(r.FollowsWhitelistAdmins) > 0 {
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r.followsWhitelistAdminsBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.FollowsWhitelistAdmins))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.FollowsWhitelistAdmins {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode FollowsWhitelistAdmins pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.followsWhitelistAdminsBin = append(r.followsWhitelistAdminsBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Convert ReadFollowsWhitelist hex strings to binary
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if len(r.ReadFollowsWhitelist) > 0 {
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r.readFollowsWhitelistBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.ReadFollowsWhitelist))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.ReadFollowsWhitelist {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode ReadFollowsWhitelist pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.readFollowsWhitelistBin = append(r.readFollowsWhitelistBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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// Convert WriteFollowsWhitelist hex strings to binary
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if len(r.WriteFollowsWhitelist) > 0 {
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r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(r.WriteFollowsWhitelist))
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for _, hexPubkey := range r.WriteFollowsWhitelist {
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binPubkey, decErr := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
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if decErr != nil {
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log.W.F("failed to decode WriteFollowsWhitelist pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, decErr)
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continue
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}
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r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin = append(r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin, binPubkey)
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}
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}
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return err
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}
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// IsInFollowsWhitelist checks if the given pubkey is in this rule's follows whitelist.
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// The pubkey parameter should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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func (r *Rule) IsInFollowsWhitelist(pubkey []byte) bool {
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if len(pubkey) == 0 || len(r.followsWhitelistFollowsBin) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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for _, follow := range r.followsWhitelistFollowsBin {
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if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, follow) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// UpdateFollowsWhitelist sets the follows list for this rule's FollowsWhitelistAdmins.
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// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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func (r *Rule) UpdateFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
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r.followsWhitelistFollowsBin = follows
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}
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// GetFollowsWhitelistAdminsBin returns the binary-encoded admin pubkeys for this rule.
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func (r *Rule) GetFollowsWhitelistAdminsBin() [][]byte {
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return r.followsWhitelistAdminsBin
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}
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// HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins returns true if this rule has FollowsWhitelistAdmins configured.
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// DEPRECATED: Use HasReadFollowsWhitelist and HasWriteFollowsWhitelist instead.
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func (r *Rule) HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins() bool {
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return len(r.FollowsWhitelistAdmins) > 0
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}
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// HasReadFollowsWhitelist returns true if this rule has ReadFollowsWhitelist configured.
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func (r *Rule) HasReadFollowsWhitelist() bool {
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return len(r.ReadFollowsWhitelist) > 0
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}
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// HasWriteFollowsWhitelist returns true if this rule has WriteFollowsWhitelist configured.
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func (r *Rule) HasWriteFollowsWhitelist() bool {
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return len(r.WriteFollowsWhitelist) > 0
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}
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// GetReadFollowsWhitelistBin returns the binary-encoded pubkeys for ReadFollowsWhitelist.
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func (r *Rule) GetReadFollowsWhitelistBin() [][]byte {
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return r.readFollowsWhitelistBin
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}
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// GetWriteFollowsWhitelistBin returns the binary-encoded pubkeys for WriteFollowsWhitelist.
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func (r *Rule) GetWriteFollowsWhitelistBin() [][]byte {
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return r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin
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}
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// UpdateReadFollowsWhitelist sets the follows list for this rule's ReadFollowsWhitelist.
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// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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func (r *Rule) UpdateReadFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
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r.readFollowsFollowsBin = follows
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}
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// UpdateWriteFollowsWhitelist sets the follows list for this rule's WriteFollowsWhitelist.
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// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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func (r *Rule) UpdateWriteFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
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r.writeFollowsFollowsBin = follows
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}
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// IsInReadFollowsWhitelist checks if the given pubkey is in this rule's read follows whitelist.
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// The pubkey parameter should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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// Returns true if either:
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// 1. The pubkey is one of the ReadFollowsWhitelist pubkeys themselves, OR
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// 2. The pubkey is in the follows list of the ReadFollowsWhitelist pubkeys.
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func (r *Rule) IsInReadFollowsWhitelist(pubkey []byte) bool {
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if len(pubkey) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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// Check if pubkey is one of the whitelist pubkeys themselves
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for _, wlPubkey := range r.readFollowsWhitelistBin {
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if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, wlPubkey) {
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return true
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}
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}
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// Check if pubkey is in the follows list
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for _, follow := range r.readFollowsFollowsBin {
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if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, follow) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// IsInWriteFollowsWhitelist checks if the given pubkey is in this rule's write follows whitelist.
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// The pubkey parameter should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
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|
// Returns true if either:
|
|
// 1. The pubkey is one of the WriteFollowsWhitelist pubkeys themselves, OR
|
|
// 2. The pubkey is in the follows list of the WriteFollowsWhitelist pubkeys.
|
|
func (r *Rule) IsInWriteFollowsWhitelist(pubkey []byte) bool {
|
|
if len(pubkey) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// Check if pubkey is one of the whitelist pubkeys themselves
|
|
for _, wlPubkey := range r.writeFollowsWhitelistBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, wlPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Check if pubkey is in the follows list
|
|
for _, follow := range r.writeFollowsFollowsBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, follow) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PolicyEvent represents an event with additional context for policy scripts.
|
|
// It embeds the Nostr event and adds authentication and network context.
|
|
type PolicyEvent struct {
|
|
*event.E
|
|
LoggedInPubkey string `json:"logged_in_pubkey,omitempty"`
|
|
IPAddress string `json:"ip_address,omitempty"`
|
|
AccessType string `json:"access_type,omitempty"` // "read" or "write"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MarshalJSON implements custom JSON marshaling for PolicyEvent.
|
|
// It safely serializes the embedded event and additional context fields.
|
|
func (pe *PolicyEvent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
if pe.E == nil {
|
|
return json.Marshal(
|
|
map[string]interface{}{
|
|
"logged_in_pubkey": pe.LoggedInPubkey,
|
|
"ip_address": pe.IPAddress,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create a safe copy of the event for JSON marshaling
|
|
safeEvent := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
"id": hex.Enc(pe.E.ID),
|
|
"pubkey": hex.Enc(pe.E.Pubkey),
|
|
"created_at": pe.E.CreatedAt,
|
|
"kind": pe.E.Kind,
|
|
"content": string(pe.E.Content),
|
|
"tags": pe.E.Tags,
|
|
"sig": hex.Enc(pe.E.Sig),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add policy-specific fields
|
|
if pe.LoggedInPubkey != "" {
|
|
safeEvent["logged_in_pubkey"] = pe.LoggedInPubkey
|
|
}
|
|
if pe.IPAddress != "" {
|
|
safeEvent["ip_address"] = pe.IPAddress
|
|
}
|
|
if pe.AccessType != "" {
|
|
safeEvent["access_type"] = pe.AccessType
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return json.Marshal(safeEvent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PolicyResponse represents a response from the policy script.
|
|
// The script should return JSON with these fields to indicate its decision.
|
|
type PolicyResponse struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
Action string `json:"action"` // accept, reject, or shadowReject
|
|
Msg string `json:"msg"` // NIP-20 response message (only used for reject)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ScriptRunner manages a single policy script process.
|
|
// Each unique script path gets its own independent runner with its own goroutine.
|
|
type ScriptRunner struct {
|
|
ctx context.Context
|
|
cancel context.CancelFunc
|
|
configDir string
|
|
scriptPath string
|
|
currentCmd *exec.Cmd
|
|
currentCancel context.CancelFunc
|
|
mutex sync.RWMutex
|
|
isRunning bool
|
|
isStarting bool
|
|
stdin io.WriteCloser
|
|
stdout io.ReadCloser
|
|
stderr io.ReadCloser
|
|
responseChan chan PolicyResponse
|
|
startupChan chan error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PolicyManager handles multiple policy script runners.
|
|
// It manages the lifecycle of policy scripts, handles communication with them,
|
|
// and provides resilient operation with automatic restart capabilities.
|
|
// Each unique script path gets its own ScriptRunner instance.
|
|
type PolicyManager struct {
|
|
ctx context.Context
|
|
cancel context.CancelFunc
|
|
configDir string
|
|
scriptPath string // Default script path for backward compatibility
|
|
enabled bool
|
|
mutex sync.RWMutex
|
|
runners map[string]*ScriptRunner // Map of script path -> runner
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// P represents a complete policy configuration for a Nostr relay.
|
|
// It defines access control rules, kind filtering, and default behavior.
|
|
// Policies are evaluated in order: global rules, kind filtering, specific rules, then default policy.
|
|
type P struct {
|
|
// Kind is policies for accepting or rejecting events by kind number.
|
|
Kind Kinds `json:"kind"`
|
|
// rules is a map of rules for criteria that must be met for the event to be allowed to be written to the relay.
|
|
// Unexported to enforce use of public API methods (CheckPolicy, IsEnabled).
|
|
rules map[int]Rule
|
|
// Global is a rule set that applies to all events.
|
|
Global Rule `json:"global"`
|
|
// DefaultPolicy determines the default behavior when no rules deny an event ("allow" or "deny", defaults to "allow")
|
|
DefaultPolicy string `json:"default_policy"`
|
|
|
|
// PolicyAdmins is a list of hex-encoded pubkeys that can update policy configuration via kind 12345 events.
|
|
// These are SEPARATE from ACL relay admins - policy admins manage policy only.
|
|
PolicyAdmins []string `json:"policy_admins,omitempty"`
|
|
// PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled enables automatic whitelisting of pubkeys followed by policy admins.
|
|
// When true and a rule has WriteAllowFollows=true, policy admin follows get read+write access.
|
|
PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled bool `json:"policy_follow_whitelist_enabled,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// Owners is a list of hex-encoded pubkeys that have full control of the relay.
|
|
// These are merged with owners from the ORLY_OWNERS environment variable.
|
|
// Useful for cloud deployments where environment variables cannot be modified.
|
|
Owners []string `json:"owners,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// Unexported binary caches for faster comparison (populated from hex strings above)
|
|
policyAdminsBin [][]byte // Binary cache for policy admin pubkeys
|
|
policyFollows [][]byte // Cached follow list from policy admins (kind 3 events)
|
|
ownersBin [][]byte // Binary cache for policy-defined owner pubkeys
|
|
|
|
// followsMx protects all follows-related caches from concurrent access.
|
|
// This includes policyFollows, Global.readFollowsFollowsBin, Global.writeFollowsFollowsBin,
|
|
// and rule-specific follows whitelists.
|
|
// Use RLock for reads (CheckPolicy) and Lock for writes (Update*Follows*).
|
|
followsMx sync.RWMutex
|
|
|
|
// manager handles policy script execution.
|
|
// Unexported to enforce use of public API methods (CheckPolicy, IsEnabled).
|
|
manager *PolicyManager
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pJSON is a shadow struct for JSON unmarshalling with exported fields.
|
|
type pJSON struct {
|
|
Kind Kinds `json:"kind"`
|
|
Rules map[int]Rule `json:"rules"`
|
|
Global Rule `json:"global"`
|
|
DefaultPolicy string `json:"default_policy"`
|
|
PolicyAdmins []string `json:"policy_admins,omitempty"`
|
|
PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled bool `json:"policy_follow_whitelist_enabled,omitempty"`
|
|
Owners []string `json:"owners,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UnmarshalJSON implements custom JSON unmarshalling to handle unexported fields.
|
|
func (p *P) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
|
|
var shadow pJSON
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &shadow); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
p.Kind = shadow.Kind
|
|
p.rules = shadow.Rules
|
|
p.Global = shadow.Global
|
|
p.DefaultPolicy = shadow.DefaultPolicy
|
|
p.PolicyAdmins = shadow.PolicyAdmins
|
|
p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled = shadow.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled
|
|
p.Owners = shadow.Owners
|
|
|
|
// Populate binary cache for policy admins
|
|
if len(p.PolicyAdmins) > 0 {
|
|
p.policyAdminsBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(p.PolicyAdmins))
|
|
for _, hexPubkey := range p.PolicyAdmins {
|
|
binPubkey, err := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to decode PolicyAdmin pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
p.policyAdminsBin = append(p.policyAdminsBin, binPubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate binary cache for policy-defined owners
|
|
if len(p.Owners) > 0 {
|
|
p.ownersBin = make([][]byte, 0, len(p.Owners))
|
|
for _, hexPubkey := range p.Owners {
|
|
binPubkey, err := hex.Dec(hexPubkey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to decode owner pubkey %q: %v", hexPubkey, err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
p.ownersBin = append(p.ownersBin, binPubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// New creates a new policy from JSON configuration.
|
|
// If policyJSON is empty, returns a policy with default settings.
|
|
// The default_policy field defaults to "allow" if not specified.
|
|
// Returns an error if the policy JSON contains invalid values (e.g., invalid
|
|
// ISO-8601 duration format for max_expiry_duration, invalid regex patterns, etc.).
|
|
func New(policyJSON []byte) (p *P, err error) {
|
|
p = &P{
|
|
DefaultPolicy: "allow", // Set default value
|
|
}
|
|
if len(policyJSON) > 0 {
|
|
// Validate JSON before loading to fail fast on invalid configurations.
|
|
// This prevents silent failures where invalid values (like "T10M" instead
|
|
// of "PT10M" for max_expiry_duration) are ignored and constraints don't apply.
|
|
if err = p.ValidateJSON(policyJSON); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy validation failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err = json.Unmarshal(policyJSON, p); chk.E(err) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal policy JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Ensure default policy is valid
|
|
if p.DefaultPolicy == "" {
|
|
p.DefaultPolicy = "allow"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate binary caches for all rules (including global rule)
|
|
p.Global.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
for kind := range p.rules {
|
|
rule := p.rules[kind] // Get a copy
|
|
rule.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule // Store the modified copy back
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsPartyInvolved checks if the given pubkey is a party involved in the event.
|
|
// A party is involved if they are either:
|
|
// 1. The author of the event (ev.Pubkey == userPubkey)
|
|
// 2. Mentioned in a p-tag of the event
|
|
//
|
|
// Both ev.Pubkey and userPubkey must be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// P-tags may be stored in either binary-optimized format (33 bytes) or hex format.
|
|
//
|
|
// This is the single source of truth for "parties_involved" / "privileged" checks.
|
|
func IsPartyInvolved(ev *event.E, userPubkey []byte) bool {
|
|
// Must be authenticated
|
|
if len(userPubkey) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if user is the author
|
|
if bytes.Equal(ev.Pubkey, userPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if user is in p tags
|
|
pTags := ev.Tags.GetAll([]byte("p"))
|
|
for _, pTag := range pTags {
|
|
// ValueHex() handles both binary and hex storage formats automatically
|
|
pt, err := hex.Dec(string(pTag.ValueHex()))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Skip malformed tags
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if bytes.Equal(pt, userPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsEnabled returns whether the policy system is enabled and ready to process events.
|
|
// This is the public API for checking if policy filtering should be applied.
|
|
func (p *P) IsEnabled() bool {
|
|
return p != nil && p.manager != nil && p.manager.IsEnabled()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getDefaultPolicyAction returns true if the default policy is "allow", false if "deny"
|
|
func (p *P) getDefaultPolicyAction() (allowed bool) {
|
|
switch p.DefaultPolicy {
|
|
case "deny":
|
|
return false
|
|
case "allow", "":
|
|
return true
|
|
default:
|
|
// Invalid value, default to allow
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewWithManager creates a new policy with a policy manager for script execution.
|
|
// It initializes the policy manager, loads configuration from files, and starts
|
|
// background processes for script management and periodic health checks.
|
|
func NewWithManager(ctx context.Context, appName string, enabled bool) *P {
|
|
configDir := filepath.Join(xdg.ConfigHome, appName)
|
|
scriptPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "policy.sh")
|
|
configPath := filepath.Join(configDir, "policy.json")
|
|
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
|
|
|
|
manager := &PolicyManager{
|
|
ctx: ctx,
|
|
cancel: cancel,
|
|
configDir: configDir,
|
|
scriptPath: scriptPath,
|
|
enabled: enabled,
|
|
runners: make(map[string]*ScriptRunner),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load policy configuration from JSON file
|
|
policy := &P{
|
|
DefaultPolicy: "allow", // Set default value
|
|
manager: manager,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if enabled {
|
|
if err := policy.LoadFromFile(configPath); err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"FATAL: Policy system is ENABLED (ORLY_POLICY_ENABLED=true) but configuration failed to load from %s: %v",
|
|
configPath, err,
|
|
)
|
|
log.E.F("The relay cannot start with an invalid policy configuration.")
|
|
log.E.F("Fix: Either disable the policy system (ORLY_POLICY_ENABLED=false) or ensure %s exists and contains valid JSON", configPath)
|
|
panic(fmt.Sprintf("fatal policy configuration error: %v", err))
|
|
}
|
|
log.I.F("loaded policy configuration from %s", configPath)
|
|
|
|
// Start the policy script if it exists and is enabled
|
|
go manager.startPolicyIfExists()
|
|
// Start periodic check for policy script availability
|
|
go manager.periodicCheck()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return policy
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getOrCreateRunner gets an existing runner for the script path or creates a new one.
|
|
// This method is thread-safe and ensures only one runner exists per unique script path.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) getOrCreateRunner(scriptPath string) *ScriptRunner {
|
|
pm.mutex.Lock()
|
|
defer pm.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Check if runner already exists
|
|
if runner, exists := pm.runners[scriptPath]; exists {
|
|
return runner
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create new runner
|
|
runnerCtx, runnerCancel := context.WithCancel(pm.ctx)
|
|
runner := &ScriptRunner{
|
|
ctx: runnerCtx,
|
|
cancel: runnerCancel,
|
|
configDir: pm.configDir,
|
|
scriptPath: scriptPath,
|
|
responseChan: make(chan PolicyResponse, 100),
|
|
startupChan: make(chan error, 1),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pm.runners[scriptPath] = runner
|
|
|
|
// Start periodic check for this runner
|
|
go runner.periodicCheck()
|
|
|
|
return runner
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ScriptRunner methods
|
|
|
|
// IsRunning returns whether the script is currently running.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) IsRunning() bool {
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
defer sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
return sr.isRunning
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ensureRunning ensures the script is running, starting it if necessary.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) ensureRunning() error {
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
// Check if already running
|
|
if sr.isRunning {
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if already starting
|
|
if sr.isStarting {
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
// Wait for startup to complete
|
|
select {
|
|
case err := <-sr.startupChan:
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Double-check it's actually running after receiving signal
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
running := sr.isRunning
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
if !running {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup completed but process is not running")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup timeout")
|
|
case <-sr.ctx.Done():
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script context cancelled")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mark as starting
|
|
sr.isStarting = true
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Start the script in a goroutine
|
|
go func() {
|
|
err := sr.Start()
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
sr.isStarting = false
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
// Signal startup completion (non-blocking)
|
|
// Drain any stale value first, then send
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-sr.startupChan:
|
|
default:
|
|
}
|
|
select {
|
|
case sr.startupChan <- err:
|
|
default:
|
|
// Channel should be empty now, but if it's full, try again
|
|
sr.startupChan <- err
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
// Wait for startup to complete
|
|
select {
|
|
case err := <-sr.startupChan:
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Double-check it's actually running after receiving signal
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
running := sr.isRunning
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
if !running {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup completed but process is not running")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
sr.isStarting = false
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script startup timeout")
|
|
case <-sr.ctx.Done():
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
sr.isStarting = false
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script context cancelled")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start starts the script process.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) Start() error {
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
defer sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if sr.isRunning {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script is already running")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(sr.scriptPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script does not exist at %s", sr.scriptPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create a new context for this command
|
|
cmdCtx, cmdCancel := context.WithCancel(sr.ctx)
|
|
|
|
// Make the script executable
|
|
if err := os.Chmod(sr.scriptPath, 0755); chk.E(err) {
|
|
cmdCancel()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to make script executable: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start the script
|
|
cmd := exec.CommandContext(cmdCtx, sr.scriptPath)
|
|
cmd.Dir = sr.configDir
|
|
|
|
// Set up stdio pipes for communication
|
|
stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe()
|
|
if chk.E(err) {
|
|
cmdCancel()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create stdin pipe: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stdout, err := cmd.StdoutPipe()
|
|
if chk.E(err) {
|
|
cmdCancel()
|
|
stdin.Close()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create stdout pipe: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stderr, err := cmd.StderrPipe()
|
|
if chk.E(err) {
|
|
cmdCancel()
|
|
stdin.Close()
|
|
stdout.Close()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create stderr pipe: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start the command
|
|
if err := cmd.Start(); chk.E(err) {
|
|
cmdCancel()
|
|
stdin.Close()
|
|
stdout.Close()
|
|
stderr.Close()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to start script: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sr.currentCmd = cmd
|
|
sr.currentCancel = cmdCancel
|
|
sr.stdin = stdin
|
|
sr.stdout = stdout
|
|
sr.stderr = stderr
|
|
sr.isRunning = true
|
|
|
|
// Start response reader in background
|
|
go sr.readResponses()
|
|
|
|
// Log stderr output in background
|
|
go sr.logOutput(stdout, stderr)
|
|
|
|
// Monitor the process
|
|
go sr.monitorProcess()
|
|
|
|
log.I.F(
|
|
"policy script started: %s (pid=%d)", sr.scriptPath, cmd.Process.Pid,
|
|
)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stop stops the script gracefully.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) Stop() error {
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
|
|
if !sr.isRunning || sr.currentCmd == nil {
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("script is not running")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Close stdin first to signal the script to exit
|
|
if sr.stdin != nil {
|
|
sr.stdin.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Cancel the context
|
|
if sr.currentCancel != nil {
|
|
sr.currentCancel()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the process reference before releasing the lock
|
|
process := sr.currentCmd.Process
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Wait for graceful shutdown with timeout
|
|
// Note: monitorProcess() is the one that calls cmd.Wait() and cleans up
|
|
// We just wait for it to finish by polling isRunning
|
|
gracefulShutdown := false
|
|
for i := 0; i < 50; i++ { // 5 seconds total (50 * 100ms)
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
running := sr.isRunning
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
if !running {
|
|
gracefulShutdown = true
|
|
log.I.F("policy script stopped gracefully: %s", sr.scriptPath)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !gracefulShutdown {
|
|
// Force kill after timeout
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy script did not stop gracefully, sending SIGKILL: %s",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
if process != nil {
|
|
if err := process.Kill(); chk.E(err) {
|
|
log.E.F("failed to kill script process: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait a bit more for monitorProcess to clean up
|
|
for i := 0; i < 30; i++ { // 3 more seconds
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
running := sr.isRunning
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
if !running {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ProcessEvent sends an event to the script and waits for a response.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) ProcessEvent(evt *PolicyEvent) (
|
|
*PolicyResponse, error,
|
|
) {
|
|
log.D.F("processing event: %s", evt.Serialize())
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
if !sr.isRunning || sr.stdin == nil {
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("script is not running")
|
|
}
|
|
stdin := sr.stdin
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Serialize the event to JSON
|
|
eventJSON, err := json.Marshal(evt)
|
|
if chk.E(err) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to serialize event: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send the event JSON to the script (newline-terminated)
|
|
if _, err := stdin.Write(append(eventJSON, '\n')); chk.E(err) {
|
|
// Check if it's a broken pipe error, which means the script has died
|
|
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "broken pipe") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "closed pipe") {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"policy script %s stdin closed (broken pipe) - script may have crashed or exited prematurely",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
// Mark as not running so it will be restarted on next periodic check
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
sr.isRunning = false
|
|
sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write event to script: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for response with timeout
|
|
select {
|
|
case response := <-sr.responseChan:
|
|
log.D.S("response", response)
|
|
return &response, nil
|
|
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy script %s response timeout - script may not be responding correctly (check for debug output on stdout)",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("script response timeout")
|
|
case <-sr.ctx.Done():
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("script context cancelled")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// readResponses reads JSONL responses from the script
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) readResponses() {
|
|
if sr.stdout == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(sr.stdout)
|
|
nonJSONLineCount := 0
|
|
for scanner.Scan() {
|
|
line := scanner.Text()
|
|
if line == "" {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
log.D.F("policy response: %s", line)
|
|
var response PolicyResponse
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &response); chk.E(err) {
|
|
// Check if this looks like debug output
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "{") {
|
|
// Looks like JSON but failed to parse
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"failed to parse policy response from %s: %v\nLine: %s",
|
|
sr.scriptPath, err, line,
|
|
)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Definitely not JSON - probably debug output
|
|
nonJSONLineCount++
|
|
if nonJSONLineCount <= 3 {
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy script %s produced non-JSON output on stdout (should only output JSONL): %q",
|
|
sr.scriptPath, line,
|
|
)
|
|
} else if nonJSONLineCount == 4 {
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy script %s continues to produce non-JSON output - suppressing further warnings",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"IMPORTANT: Policy scripts must ONLY write JSON responses to stdout. Use stderr or a log file for debug output.",
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send response to channel (non-blocking)
|
|
select {
|
|
case sr.responseChan <- response:
|
|
default:
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy response channel full for %s, dropping response",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := scanner.Err(); chk.E(err) {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"error reading policy responses from %s: %v", sr.scriptPath, err,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// logOutput logs the output from stderr
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) logOutput(_ /* stdout */, stderr io.ReadCloser) {
|
|
defer stderr.Close()
|
|
|
|
// Only log stderr, stdout is used by readResponses
|
|
go func() {
|
|
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(stderr)
|
|
for scanner.Scan() {
|
|
line := scanner.Text()
|
|
if line != "" {
|
|
// Log script stderr output through relay logging system
|
|
log.I.F("[policy script %s] %s", sr.scriptPath, line)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := scanner.Err(); chk.E(err) {
|
|
log.E.F("error reading stderr from policy script %s: %v", sr.scriptPath, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// monitorProcess monitors the script process and cleans up when it exits
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) monitorProcess() {
|
|
if sr.currentCmd == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := sr.currentCmd.Wait()
|
|
|
|
sr.mutex.Lock()
|
|
defer sr.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Clean up pipes
|
|
if sr.stdin != nil {
|
|
sr.stdin.Close()
|
|
sr.stdin = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if sr.stdout != nil {
|
|
sr.stdout.Close()
|
|
sr.stdout = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if sr.stderr != nil {
|
|
sr.stderr.Close()
|
|
sr.stderr = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sr.isRunning = false
|
|
sr.currentCmd = nil
|
|
sr.currentCancel = nil
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"policy script exited with error: %s: %v, will retry periodically",
|
|
sr.scriptPath, err,
|
|
)
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.I.F("policy script exited normally: %s", sr.scriptPath)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// periodicCheck periodically checks if script becomes available and attempts to restart failed scripts.
|
|
func (sr *ScriptRunner) periodicCheck() {
|
|
ticker := time.NewTicker(60 * time.Second)
|
|
defer ticker.Stop()
|
|
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-sr.ctx.Done():
|
|
return
|
|
case <-ticker.C:
|
|
sr.mutex.RLock()
|
|
running := sr.isRunning
|
|
sr.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Check if script is not running and try to start it
|
|
if !running {
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(sr.scriptPath); err == nil {
|
|
// Script exists but not running, try to start
|
|
go func() {
|
|
if err := sr.Start(); err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"failed to restart policy script %s: %v, will retry in next cycle",
|
|
sr.scriptPath, err,
|
|
)
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.I.F(
|
|
"policy script restarted successfully: %s",
|
|
sr.scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoadFromFile loads policy configuration from a JSON file.
|
|
// Returns an error if the file doesn't exist, can't be read, or contains invalid JSON.
|
|
func (p *P) LoadFromFile(configPath string) error {
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(configPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"policy configuration file does not exist: %s", configPath,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
configData, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read policy configuration file: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(configData) == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy configuration file is empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(configData, p); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy configuration JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate binary caches for all rules (including global rule)
|
|
p.Global.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
for kind, rule := range p.rules {
|
|
rule.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule // Update the map with the modified rule
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CheckPolicy checks if an event is allowed based on the policy configuration.
|
|
// The access parameter should be "write" for accepting events or "read" for filtering events.
|
|
// Returns true if the event is allowed, false if denied, and an error if validation fails.
|
|
//
|
|
// Policy evaluation order (more specific rules take precedence):
|
|
// 1. Kinds whitelist/blacklist - if kind is blocked, deny immediately
|
|
// 2. Kind-specific rule - if exists for this kind, use it exclusively
|
|
// 3. Global rule - fallback if no kind-specific rule exists
|
|
// 4. Default policy - fallback if no rules apply
|
|
//
|
|
// Thread-safety: Uses followsMx.RLock to protect reads of follows whitelists during policy checks.
|
|
// Write operations (Update*) acquire the write lock, which blocks concurrent reads.
|
|
func (p *P) CheckPolicy(
|
|
access string, ev *event.E, loggedInPubkey []byte, ipAddress string,
|
|
) (allowed bool, err error) {
|
|
// Handle nil policy - this should not happen if policy is enabled
|
|
// If policy is enabled but p is nil, it's a configuration error
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
log.F.Ln("FATAL: CheckPolicy called on nil policy - this indicates misconfiguration. " +
|
|
"If ORLY_POLICY_ENABLED=true, ensure policy configuration is valid.")
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("policy is nil but policy checking is enabled - check configuration")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Handle nil event
|
|
if ev == nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("event cannot be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Acquire read lock to protect follows whitelists during policy check
|
|
p.followsMx.RLock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
// STEP 1: Check kinds whitelist/blacklist (applies before any rule checks)
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
if !p.checkKindsPolicy(ev.Kind) {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
// STEP 2: Check KIND-SPECIFIC rule FIRST (more specific = higher priority)
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
// If kind-specific rule exists and accepts, that's final - global is ignored.
|
|
rule, hasKindRule := p.rules[int(ev.Kind)]
|
|
if hasKindRule {
|
|
// Check if script is present and enabled for this kind
|
|
if rule.Script != "" && p.manager != nil {
|
|
if p.manager.IsEnabled() {
|
|
// Check if script file exists before trying to use it
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(rule.Script); err == nil {
|
|
// Script exists, try to use it
|
|
log.D.F("using policy script for kind %d: %s", ev.Kind, rule.Script)
|
|
allowed, err := p.checkScriptPolicy(
|
|
access, ev, rule.Script, loggedInPubkey, ipAddress,
|
|
)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
// Script ran successfully, return its decision
|
|
return allowed, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// Script failed, fall through to apply other criteria
|
|
log.W.F("policy script check failed for kind %d: %v, applying other criteria",
|
|
ev.Kind, err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Script configured but doesn't exist
|
|
log.W.F("policy script configured for kind %d but not found at %s: %v, applying other criteria",
|
|
ev.Kind, rule.Script, err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Script doesn't exist or failed, fall through to apply other criteria
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Policy manager is disabled, fall back to default policy
|
|
log.D.F("policy manager is disabled for kind %d, falling back to default policy (%s)",
|
|
ev.Kind, p.DefaultPolicy)
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply kind-specific rule-based filtering
|
|
return p.checkRulePolicy(access, ev, rule, loggedInPubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
// STEP 3: No kind-specific rule - check GLOBAL rule as fallback
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
|
|
// Check if global rule has any configuration
|
|
if p.Global.hasAnyRules() {
|
|
// Apply global rule filtering
|
|
return p.checkRulePolicy(access, ev, p.Global, loggedInPubkey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
// STEP 4: No kind-specific or global rules - use default policy
|
|
// ==========================================================================
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkKindsPolicy checks if the event kind is allowed.
|
|
// Logic:
|
|
// 1. If explicit whitelist exists, use it (backwards compatibility)
|
|
// 2. If explicit blacklist exists, use it (backwards compatibility)
|
|
// 3. Otherwise, kinds with defined rules are implicitly allowed, others denied
|
|
func (p *P) checkKindsPolicy(kind uint16) bool {
|
|
// If whitelist is present, only allow whitelisted kinds
|
|
if len(p.Kind.Whitelist) > 0 {
|
|
for _, allowedKind := range p.Kind.Whitelist {
|
|
if kind == uint16(allowedKind) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If blacklist is present, deny blacklisted kinds
|
|
if len(p.Kind.Blacklist) > 0 {
|
|
for _, deniedKind := range p.Kind.Blacklist {
|
|
if kind == uint16(deniedKind) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Not in blacklist - check if rule exists for implicit whitelist
|
|
_, hasRule := p.rules[int(kind)]
|
|
return hasRule // Only allow if there's a rule defined
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No explicit whitelist or blacklist
|
|
// Behavior depends on whether default_policy is explicitly set:
|
|
// - If default_policy is explicitly "allow", allow all kinds (rules add constraints, not restrictions)
|
|
// - If default_policy is unset or "deny", use implicit whitelist (only allow kinds with rules)
|
|
// - If global rule has any configuration, allow kinds through for global rule checking
|
|
if len(p.rules) > 0 {
|
|
// If default_policy is explicitly "allow", don't use implicit whitelist
|
|
if p.DefaultPolicy == "allow" {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
// Implicit whitelist mode - only allow kinds with specific rules
|
|
_, hasRule := p.rules[int(kind)]
|
|
if hasRule {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
// No kind-specific rule, but check if global rule exists
|
|
if p.Global.hasAnyRules() {
|
|
return true // Allow through for global rule check
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// No kind-specific rules - check if global rule exists
|
|
if p.Global.hasAnyRules() {
|
|
return true // Allow through for global rule check
|
|
}
|
|
// No rules at all - fall back to default policy
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkGlobalFollowsWhitelistAccess checks if the user is explicitly granted access
|
|
// via the global rule's follows whitelists (read_follows_whitelist or write_follows_whitelist).
|
|
// This grants access that bypasses the default policy for kinds without specific rules.
|
|
// Note: p should never be nil here - caller (CheckPolicy) already validates this.
|
|
func (p *P) checkGlobalFollowsWhitelistAccess(access string, loggedInPubkey []byte) bool {
|
|
if len(loggedInPubkey) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if access == "read" {
|
|
// Check if user is in global read follows whitelist
|
|
if p.Global.HasReadFollowsWhitelist() && p.Global.IsInReadFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
// Also check legacy WriteAllowFollows and FollowsWhitelistAdmins for read access
|
|
if p.Global.WriteAllowFollows && p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled && p.IsPolicyFollow(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if p.Global.HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins() && p.Global.IsInFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
} else if access == "write" {
|
|
// Check if user is in global write follows whitelist
|
|
if p.Global.HasWriteFollowsWhitelist() && p.Global.IsInWriteFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
// Also check legacy WriteAllowFollows and FollowsWhitelistAdmins for write access
|
|
if p.Global.WriteAllowFollows && p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled && p.IsPolicyFollow(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if p.Global.HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins() && p.Global.IsInFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkGlobalRulePolicy checks if the event passes the global rule filter
|
|
// Note: p should never be nil here - caller (CheckPolicy) already validates this.
|
|
func (p *P) checkGlobalRulePolicy(
|
|
access string, ev *event.E, loggedInPubkey []byte,
|
|
) bool {
|
|
// Skip if no global rules are configured
|
|
if !p.Global.hasAnyRules() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply global rule filtering
|
|
allowed, err := p.checkRulePolicy(access, ev, p.Global, loggedInPubkey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F("global rule policy check failed: %v", err)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return allowed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkRulePolicy evaluates rule-based access control with the following logic:
|
|
//
|
|
// READ ACCESS (default-permissive):
|
|
// - Denied if in read_deny list
|
|
// - If read_allow, read_follows_whitelist, or privileged is set, user must pass one of those checks
|
|
// - Otherwise, read is allowed by default
|
|
//
|
|
// WRITE ACCESS (default-permissive):
|
|
// - Denied if in write_deny list
|
|
// - Universal constraints (size, tags, age) apply to writes only
|
|
// - If write_allow or write_follows_whitelist is set, user must pass one of those checks
|
|
// - Otherwise, write is allowed by default
|
|
//
|
|
// PRIVILEGED: Only applies to READ operations (party-involved check)
|
|
func (p *P) checkRulePolicy(
|
|
access string, ev *event.E, rule Rule, loggedInPubkey []byte,
|
|
) (allowed bool, err error) {
|
|
log.T.F("checkRulePolicy: access=%s kind=%d readFollowsFollowsBin_len=%d readFollowsWhitelistBin_len=%d HasReadFollowsWhitelist=%v",
|
|
access, ev.Kind, len(rule.readFollowsFollowsBin), len(rule.readFollowsWhitelistBin), rule.HasReadFollowsWhitelist())
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 1: Universal Constraints (WRITE ONLY - apply to everyone)
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
if access == "write" {
|
|
// Check size limits
|
|
if rule.SizeLimit != nil {
|
|
eventSize := int64(len(ev.Serialize()))
|
|
if eventSize > *rule.SizeLimit {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if rule.ContentLimit != nil {
|
|
contentSize := int64(len(ev.Content))
|
|
if contentSize > *rule.ContentLimit {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check required tags
|
|
if len(rule.MustHaveTags) > 0 {
|
|
for _, requiredTag := range rule.MustHaveTags {
|
|
if ev.Tags.GetFirst([]byte(requiredTag)) == nil {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check expiry time (uses maxExpirySeconds which is parsed from MaxExpiryDuration or MaxExpiry)
|
|
if rule.maxExpirySeconds != nil && *rule.maxExpirySeconds > 0 {
|
|
expiryTag := ev.Tags.GetFirst([]byte("expiration"))
|
|
if expiryTag == nil {
|
|
return false, nil // Must have expiry if max_expiry is set
|
|
}
|
|
// Parse expiry timestamp and validate it's within allowed duration from created_at
|
|
expiryStr := string(expiryTag.Value())
|
|
expiryTs, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(expiryStr, 10, 64)
|
|
if parseErr != nil {
|
|
log.D.F("invalid expiration tag value %q: %v", expiryStr, parseErr)
|
|
return false, nil // Invalid expiry format
|
|
}
|
|
maxAllowedExpiry := ev.CreatedAt + *rule.maxExpirySeconds
|
|
if expiryTs >= maxAllowedExpiry {
|
|
log.D.F("expiration %d exceeds max allowed %d (created_at %d + max_expiry %d)",
|
|
expiryTs, maxAllowedExpiry, ev.CreatedAt, *rule.maxExpirySeconds)
|
|
return false, nil // Expiry too far in the future
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check ProtectedRequired (NIP-70: events must have "-" tag)
|
|
if rule.ProtectedRequired {
|
|
protectedTag := ev.Tags.GetFirst([]byte("-"))
|
|
if protectedTag == nil {
|
|
log.D.F("protected_required: event missing '-' tag (NIP-70)")
|
|
return false, nil // Must have protected tag
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check IdentifierRegex (validates "d" tag values)
|
|
if rule.identifierRegexCache != nil {
|
|
dTags := ev.Tags.GetAll([]byte("d"))
|
|
if len(dTags) == 0 {
|
|
log.D.F("identifier_regex: event missing 'd' tag")
|
|
return false, nil // Must have d tag if identifier_regex is set
|
|
}
|
|
for _, dTag := range dTags {
|
|
value := string(dTag.Value())
|
|
if !rule.identifierRegexCache.MatchString(value) {
|
|
log.D.F("identifier_regex: d tag value %q does not match pattern %q",
|
|
value, rule.IdentifierRegex)
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check MaxAgeOfEvent (maximum age of event in seconds)
|
|
if rule.MaxAgeOfEvent != nil && *rule.MaxAgeOfEvent > 0 {
|
|
currentTime := time.Now().Unix()
|
|
maxAllowedTime := currentTime - *rule.MaxAgeOfEvent
|
|
if ev.CreatedAt < maxAllowedTime {
|
|
return false, nil // Event is too old
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check MaxAgeEventInFuture (maximum time event can be in the future in seconds)
|
|
if rule.MaxAgeEventInFuture != nil && *rule.MaxAgeEventInFuture > 0 {
|
|
currentTime := time.Now().Unix()
|
|
maxFutureTime := currentTime + *rule.MaxAgeEventInFuture
|
|
if ev.CreatedAt > maxFutureTime {
|
|
return false, nil // Event is too far in the future
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check tag validation rules (regex patterns)
|
|
// NOTE: TagValidation only validates tags that ARE present on the event.
|
|
// To REQUIRE a tag to exist, use MustHaveTags instead.
|
|
if len(rule.TagValidation) > 0 {
|
|
for tagName, regexPattern := range rule.TagValidation {
|
|
// Compile regex pattern (errors should have been caught in ValidateJSON)
|
|
regex, compileErr := regexp.Compile(regexPattern)
|
|
if compileErr != nil {
|
|
log.E.F("invalid regex pattern for tag %q: %v (skipping validation)", tagName, compileErr)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get all tags with this name
|
|
tags := ev.Tags.GetAll([]byte(tagName))
|
|
|
|
// If no tags found, skip validation for this tag type
|
|
// (TagValidation validates format, not presence - use MustHaveTags for presence)
|
|
if len(tags) == 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate each tag value against regex
|
|
for _, t := range tags {
|
|
value := string(t.Value())
|
|
if !regex.MatchString(value) {
|
|
log.D.F("tag validation failed: tag %q value %q does not match pattern %q",
|
|
tagName, value, regexPattern)
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 2: Explicit Denials (highest priority blacklist)
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
if access == "write" {
|
|
// Check write deny list - deny specific users from submitting events
|
|
if len(rule.writeDenyBin) > 0 {
|
|
for _, deniedPubkey := range rule.writeDenyBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(loggedInPubkey, deniedPubkey) {
|
|
return false, nil // Submitter explicitly denied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(rule.WriteDeny) > 0 {
|
|
// Fallback: binary cache not populated, use hex comparison
|
|
loggedInPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(loggedInPubkey)
|
|
for _, deniedPubkey := range rule.WriteDeny {
|
|
if loggedInPubkeyHex == deniedPubkey {
|
|
return false, nil // Submitter explicitly denied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if access == "read" {
|
|
// Check read deny list
|
|
if len(rule.readDenyBin) > 0 {
|
|
for _, deniedPubkey := range rule.readDenyBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(loggedInPubkey, deniedPubkey) {
|
|
return false, nil // Explicitly denied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(rule.ReadDeny) > 0 {
|
|
// Fallback: binary cache not populated, use hex comparison
|
|
loggedInPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(loggedInPubkey)
|
|
for _, deniedPubkey := range rule.ReadDeny {
|
|
if loggedInPubkeyHex == deniedPubkey {
|
|
return false, nil // Explicitly denied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 3: Legacy WriteAllowFollows (grants BOTH read AND write access)
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
// WriteAllowFollows grants both read and write access to policy admin follows
|
|
// This check applies to BOTH read and write access types (legacy behavior)
|
|
if rule.WriteAllowFollows && p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled {
|
|
if p.IsPolicyFollow(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
log.D.F("policy admin follow granted %s access for kind %d", access, ev.Kind)
|
|
return true, nil // Allow access from policy admin follow
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// FollowsWhitelistAdmins grants access to follows of specific admin pubkeys for this rule
|
|
// This is a per-rule alternative to WriteAllowFollows which uses global PolicyAdmins (DEPRECATED)
|
|
if rule.HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins() {
|
|
if rule.IsInFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
log.D.F("follows_whitelist_admins granted %s access for kind %d", access, ev.Kind)
|
|
return true, nil // Allow access from rule-specific admin follow
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 4: New Follows Whitelist Checks (separate read/write)
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
if access == "read" {
|
|
// Check ReadFollowsWhitelist - if set, it acts as a whitelist
|
|
if rule.HasReadFollowsWhitelist() {
|
|
if rule.IsInReadFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
log.D.F("read_follows_whitelist granted read access for kind %d", ev.Kind)
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// ReadFollowsWhitelist is set but user is not in it
|
|
// Continue to check other access methods (privileged, read_allow)
|
|
}
|
|
} else if access == "write" {
|
|
// Check WriteFollowsWhitelist - if set, it acts as a whitelist
|
|
if rule.HasWriteFollowsWhitelist() {
|
|
if rule.IsInWriteFollowsWhitelist(loggedInPubkey) {
|
|
log.D.F("write_follows_whitelist granted write access for kind %d", ev.Kind)
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// WriteFollowsWhitelist is set but user is not in it - must check write_allow too
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 5: Read Access Control
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
if access == "read" {
|
|
hasReadAllowList := len(rule.readAllowBin) > 0 || len(rule.ReadAllow) > 0
|
|
hasReadFollowsWhitelist := rule.HasReadFollowsWhitelist()
|
|
// Include deprecated FollowsWhitelistAdmins for backward compatibility (it grants read+write)
|
|
hasLegacyFollowsWhitelist := rule.HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins()
|
|
userIsPrivileged := rule.Privileged && IsPartyInvolved(ev, loggedInPubkey)
|
|
|
|
// Check if user is in read allow list
|
|
userInAllowList := false
|
|
if len(rule.readAllowBin) > 0 {
|
|
for _, allowedPubkey := range rule.readAllowBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(loggedInPubkey, allowedPubkey) {
|
|
userInAllowList = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(rule.ReadAllow) > 0 {
|
|
loggedInPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(loggedInPubkey)
|
|
for _, allowedPubkey := range rule.ReadAllow {
|
|
if loggedInPubkeyHex == allowedPubkey {
|
|
userInAllowList = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine if any read whitelist restriction is active
|
|
// Note: Legacy FollowsWhitelistAdmins also counts as a read restriction for backward compatibility
|
|
hasReadRestriction := hasReadAllowList || hasReadFollowsWhitelist || hasLegacyFollowsWhitelist || rule.Privileged
|
|
|
|
if hasReadRestriction {
|
|
// User must pass one of the configured access methods
|
|
if userInAllowList {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if userIsPrivileged {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// User is in ReadFollowsWhitelist was already checked in STEP 4
|
|
// User in legacy FollowsWhitelistAdmins was already checked in STEP 3
|
|
// If we reach here with a read restriction, deny access
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No read restriction configured - read is permissive by default
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 6: Write Access Control
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
if access == "write" {
|
|
hasWriteAllowList := len(rule.writeAllowBin) > 0 || len(rule.WriteAllow) > 0
|
|
hasWriteFollowsWhitelist := rule.HasWriteFollowsWhitelist()
|
|
// Include deprecated FollowsWhitelistAdmins for backward compatibility
|
|
hasLegacyFollowsWhitelist := rule.HasFollowsWhitelistAdmins()
|
|
|
|
// Check if user is in write allow list
|
|
userInAllowList := false
|
|
if len(rule.writeAllowBin) > 0 {
|
|
for _, allowedPubkey := range rule.writeAllowBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(loggedInPubkey, allowedPubkey) {
|
|
userInAllowList = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(rule.WriteAllow) > 0 {
|
|
loggedInPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(loggedInPubkey)
|
|
for _, allowedPubkey := range rule.WriteAllow {
|
|
if loggedInPubkeyHex == allowedPubkey {
|
|
userInAllowList = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine if any write whitelist restriction is active
|
|
// Note: Legacy FollowsWhitelistAdmins also counts as a write restriction for backward compatibility
|
|
hasWriteRestriction := hasWriteAllowList || hasWriteFollowsWhitelist || hasLegacyFollowsWhitelist
|
|
|
|
if hasWriteRestriction {
|
|
// User must pass one of the configured access methods
|
|
if userInAllowList {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// User in WriteFollowsWhitelist was already checked in STEP 4
|
|
// User in legacy FollowsWhitelistAdmins was already checked in STEP 3
|
|
// If we reach here with a write restriction, deny access
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No write restriction configured - write is permissive by default
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
// STEP 7: Default Policy (fallback)
|
|
// ===================================================================
|
|
|
|
// If no specific rules matched, use the configured default policy
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkScriptPolicy runs the policy script to determine if event should be allowed
|
|
func (p *P) checkScriptPolicy(
|
|
access string, ev *event.E, scriptPath string, loggedInPubkey []byte,
|
|
ipAddress string,
|
|
) (allowed bool, err error) {
|
|
if p.manager == nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("policy manager is not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If policy is disabled, fall back to default policy immediately
|
|
if !p.manager.IsEnabled() {
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy rule for kind %d is inactive (policy disabled), falling back to default policy (%s)",
|
|
ev.Kind, p.DefaultPolicy,
|
|
)
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if script file exists
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(scriptPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
|
|
// Script doesn't exist, return error so caller can fall back to other criteria
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"policy script does not exist at %s", scriptPath,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get or create a runner for this specific script path
|
|
runner := p.manager.getOrCreateRunner(scriptPath)
|
|
|
|
// Policy is enabled, check if this runner is running
|
|
if !runner.IsRunning() {
|
|
// Try to start this runner and wait for it
|
|
log.D.F("starting policy script for kind %d: %s", ev.Kind, scriptPath)
|
|
if err := runner.ensureRunning(); err != nil {
|
|
// Startup failed, return error so caller can fall back to other criteria
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"failed to start policy script %s: %v", scriptPath, err,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
log.I.F("policy script started for kind %d: %s", ev.Kind, scriptPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create policy event with additional context
|
|
policyEvent := &PolicyEvent{
|
|
E: ev,
|
|
LoggedInPubkey: hex.Enc(loggedInPubkey),
|
|
IPAddress: ipAddress,
|
|
AccessType: access,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Process event through policy script
|
|
response, scriptErr := runner.ProcessEvent(policyEvent)
|
|
if chk.E(scriptErr) {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"policy rule for kind %d failed (script processing error: %v), falling back to default policy (%s)",
|
|
ev.Kind, scriptErr, p.DefaultPolicy,
|
|
)
|
|
// Fall back to default policy on script failure
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Handle script response
|
|
switch response.Action {
|
|
case "accept":
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
case "reject":
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
case "shadowReject":
|
|
return false, nil // Treat as reject for policy purposes
|
|
default:
|
|
log.W.F(
|
|
"policy rule for kind %d returned unknown action '%s', falling back to default policy (%s)",
|
|
ev.Kind, response.Action, p.DefaultPolicy,
|
|
)
|
|
// Fall back to default policy for unknown actions
|
|
return p.getDefaultPolicyAction(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PolicyManager methods
|
|
|
|
// periodicCheck periodically checks if the default policy script becomes available.
|
|
// This is for backward compatibility with the default script path.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) periodicCheck() {
|
|
// Get or create runner for the default script path
|
|
// This will also start its own periodic check
|
|
pm.getOrCreateRunner(pm.scriptPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// startPolicyIfExists starts the default policy script if the file exists.
|
|
// This is for backward compatibility with the default script path.
|
|
// Only logs if the default script actually exists - missing default scripts are normal
|
|
// when users configure rule-specific scripts.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) startPolicyIfExists() {
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(pm.scriptPath); err == nil {
|
|
// Default script exists, try to start it
|
|
log.I.F("found default policy script at %s, starting...", pm.scriptPath)
|
|
runner := pm.getOrCreateRunner(pm.scriptPath)
|
|
if err := runner.Start(); err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F(
|
|
"failed to start default policy script: %v, will retry periodically",
|
|
err,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Silently ignore if default script doesn't exist - it's fine if rules use custom scripts
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsEnabled returns whether the policy manager is enabled.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) IsEnabled() bool {
|
|
return pm.enabled
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsRunning returns whether the default policy script is currently running.
|
|
// Deprecated: Use getOrCreateRunner(scriptPath).IsRunning() for specific scripts.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) IsRunning() bool {
|
|
pm.mutex.RLock()
|
|
defer pm.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Check if default script runner exists and is running
|
|
if runner, exists := pm.runners[pm.scriptPath]; exists {
|
|
return runner.IsRunning()
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetScriptPath returns the default script path.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) GetScriptPath() string {
|
|
return pm.scriptPath
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Shutdown gracefully shuts down the policy manager and all running scripts.
|
|
func (pm *PolicyManager) Shutdown() {
|
|
pm.cancel()
|
|
|
|
pm.mutex.Lock()
|
|
defer pm.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Stop all running scripts
|
|
for path, runner := range pm.runners {
|
|
if runner.IsRunning() {
|
|
log.I.F("stopping policy script: %s", path)
|
|
runner.Stop()
|
|
}
|
|
// Cancel the runner's context
|
|
runner.cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clear runners map
|
|
pm.runners = make(map[string]*ScriptRunner)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Policy Hot Reload Methods
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// ValidateJSON validates policy JSON without applying changes.
|
|
// This is called BEFORE any modifications to ensure JSON is valid.
|
|
// Returns error if validation fails - no changes are made to current policy.
|
|
func (p *P) ValidateJSON(policyJSON []byte) error {
|
|
// Try to unmarshal into a temporary policy struct
|
|
tempPolicy := &P{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(policyJSON, tempPolicy); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JSON syntax: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate policy_admins are valid hex pubkeys (64 characters)
|
|
for _, admin := range tempPolicy.PolicyAdmins {
|
|
if len(admin) != 64 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy_admin pubkey length: %q (expected 64 hex characters)", admin)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := hex.Dec(admin); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid policy_admin pubkey format: %q: %v", admin, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate owners are valid hex pubkeys (64 characters)
|
|
for _, owner := range tempPolicy.Owners {
|
|
if len(owner) != 64 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid owner pubkey length: %q (expected 64 hex characters)", owner)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := hex.Dec(owner); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid owner pubkey format: %q: %v", owner, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: Owner-specific validation (non-empty owners) is done in ValidateOwnerPolicyUpdate
|
|
|
|
// Validate regex patterns in tag_validation rules and new fields
|
|
for kind, rule := range tempPolicy.rules {
|
|
for tagName, pattern := range rule.TagValidation {
|
|
if _, err := regexp.Compile(pattern); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid regex pattern for tag %q in kind %d: %v", tagName, kind, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Validate IdentifierRegex pattern
|
|
if rule.IdentifierRegex != "" {
|
|
if _, err := regexp.Compile(rule.IdentifierRegex); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid identifier_regex pattern in kind %d: %v", kind, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Validate MaxExpiryDuration format
|
|
if rule.MaxExpiryDuration != "" {
|
|
if _, err := parseDuration(rule.MaxExpiryDuration); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid max_expiry_duration %q in kind %d: %v (format must be ISO-8601 duration, e.g. \"PT10M\" for 10 minutes, \"P7D\" for 7 days, \"P1DT12H\" for 1 day 12 hours)", rule.MaxExpiryDuration, kind, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Validate FollowsWhitelistAdmins pubkeys
|
|
for _, admin := range rule.FollowsWhitelistAdmins {
|
|
if len(admin) != 64 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid follows_whitelist_admins pubkey length in kind %d: %q (expected 64 hex characters)", kind, admin)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := hex.Dec(admin); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid follows_whitelist_admins pubkey format in kind %d: %q: %v", kind, admin, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate global rule tag_validation patterns
|
|
for tagName, pattern := range tempPolicy.Global.TagValidation {
|
|
if _, err := regexp.Compile(pattern); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid regex pattern for tag %q in global rule: %v", tagName, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate global rule IdentifierRegex pattern
|
|
if tempPolicy.Global.IdentifierRegex != "" {
|
|
if _, err := regexp.Compile(tempPolicy.Global.IdentifierRegex); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid identifier_regex pattern in global rule: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate global rule MaxExpiryDuration format
|
|
if tempPolicy.Global.MaxExpiryDuration != "" {
|
|
if _, err := parseDuration(tempPolicy.Global.MaxExpiryDuration); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid max_expiry_duration %q in global rule: %v (format must be ISO-8601 duration, e.g. \"PT10M\" for 10 minutes, \"P7D\" for 7 days, \"P1DT12H\" for 1 day 12 hours)", tempPolicy.Global.MaxExpiryDuration, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate global rule FollowsWhitelistAdmins pubkeys
|
|
for _, admin := range tempPolicy.Global.FollowsWhitelistAdmins {
|
|
if len(admin) != 64 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid follows_whitelist_admins pubkey length in global rule: %q (expected 64 hex characters)", admin)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := hex.Dec(admin); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid follows_whitelist_admins pubkey format in global rule: %q: %v", admin, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate default_policy value
|
|
if tempPolicy.DefaultPolicy != "" && tempPolicy.DefaultPolicy != "allow" && tempPolicy.DefaultPolicy != "deny" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid default_policy value: %q (must be \"allow\" or \"deny\")", tempPolicy.DefaultPolicy)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.D.F("policy JSON validation passed")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reload loads policy from JSON bytes and applies it to the existing policy instance.
|
|
// This validates JSON FIRST, then pauses the policy manager, updates configuration, and resumes.
|
|
// Returns error if validation fails - no changes are made on validation failure.
|
|
func (p *P) Reload(policyJSON []byte, configPath string) error {
|
|
// Step 1: Validate JSON FIRST (before making any changes)
|
|
if err := p.ValidateJSON(policyJSON); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("validation failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 2: Pause policy manager (stop script runners)
|
|
if err := p.Pause(); err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to pause policy manager (continuing anyway): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 3: Unmarshal JSON into a temporary struct
|
|
tempPolicy := &P{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(policyJSON, tempPolicy); err != nil {
|
|
// Resume before returning error
|
|
p.Resume()
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal policy JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 4: Apply the new configuration (preserve manager reference)
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
p.Kind = tempPolicy.Kind
|
|
p.rules = tempPolicy.rules
|
|
p.Global = tempPolicy.Global
|
|
p.DefaultPolicy = tempPolicy.DefaultPolicy
|
|
p.PolicyAdmins = tempPolicy.PolicyAdmins
|
|
p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled = tempPolicy.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled
|
|
p.Owners = tempPolicy.Owners
|
|
p.policyAdminsBin = tempPolicy.policyAdminsBin
|
|
p.ownersBin = tempPolicy.ownersBin
|
|
// Note: policyFollows is NOT reset here - it will be refreshed separately
|
|
p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Step 5: Populate binary caches for all rules
|
|
p.Global.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
for kind := range p.rules {
|
|
rule := p.rules[kind]
|
|
rule.populateBinaryCache()
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 6: Save to file (atomic write)
|
|
if err := p.SaveToFile(configPath); err != nil {
|
|
log.E.F("failed to persist policy to disk: %v (policy was updated in memory)", err)
|
|
// Continue anyway - policy is loaded in memory
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 7: Resume policy manager (restart script runners)
|
|
if err := p.Resume(); err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to resume policy manager: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.I.F("policy configuration reloaded successfully")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Pause pauses the policy manager and stops all script runners.
|
|
func (p *P) Pause() error {
|
|
if p.manager == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy manager is not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.manager.mutex.Lock()
|
|
defer p.manager.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Stop all running scripts
|
|
for path, runner := range p.manager.runners {
|
|
if runner.IsRunning() {
|
|
log.I.F("pausing policy script: %s", path)
|
|
if err := runner.Stop(); err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to stop runner %s: %v", path, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.I.F("policy manager paused")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Resume resumes the policy manager and restarts script runners.
|
|
func (p *P) Resume() error {
|
|
if p.manager == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy manager is not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Restart the default policy script if it exists
|
|
go p.manager.startPolicyIfExists()
|
|
|
|
// Restart rule-specific scripts
|
|
for _, rule := range p.rules {
|
|
if rule.Script != "" {
|
|
if _, err := os.Stat(rule.Script); err == nil {
|
|
runner := p.manager.getOrCreateRunner(rule.Script)
|
|
go func(r *ScriptRunner, script string) {
|
|
if err := r.Start(); err != nil {
|
|
log.W.F("failed to restart policy script %s: %v", script, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}(runner, rule.Script)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.I.F("policy manager resumed")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SaveToFile persists the current policy configuration to disk using atomic write.
|
|
// Uses temp file + rename pattern to ensure atomic writes.
|
|
func (p *P) SaveToFile(configPath string) error {
|
|
// Create shadow struct for JSON marshalling
|
|
shadow := pJSON{
|
|
Kind: p.Kind,
|
|
Rules: p.rules,
|
|
Global: p.Global,
|
|
DefaultPolicy: p.DefaultPolicy,
|
|
PolicyAdmins: p.PolicyAdmins,
|
|
PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled: p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled,
|
|
Owners: p.Owners,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Marshal to JSON with indentation for readability
|
|
jsonData, err := json.MarshalIndent(shadow, "", " ")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal policy to JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write to temp file first (atomic write pattern)
|
|
tempPath := configPath + ".tmp"
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(tempPath, jsonData, 0644); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write temp file: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Rename temp file to actual config file (atomic on most filesystems)
|
|
if err := os.Rename(tempPath, configPath); err != nil {
|
|
// Clean up temp file on failure
|
|
os.Remove(tempPath)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename temp file: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.I.F("policy configuration saved to %s", configPath)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Policy Admin and Follow Checking Methods
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// IsPolicyAdmin checks if the given pubkey is in the policy_admins list.
|
|
// The pubkey parameter should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
func (p *P) IsPolicyAdmin(pubkey []byte) bool {
|
|
if len(pubkey) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.followsMx.RLock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
for _, admin := range p.policyAdminsBin {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(admin, pubkey) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsPolicyFollow checks if the given pubkey is in the policy admin follows list.
|
|
// The pubkey parameter should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
func (p *P) IsPolicyFollow(pubkey []byte) bool {
|
|
if len(pubkey) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.followsMx.RLock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
for _, follow := range p.policyFollows {
|
|
if utils.FastEqual(pubkey, follow) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdatePolicyFollows replaces the policy follows list with a new set of pubkeys.
|
|
// This is called when policy admins update their follow lists (kind 3 events).
|
|
// The pubkeys should be binary ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdatePolicyFollows(follows [][]byte) {
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
p.policyFollows = follows
|
|
log.I.F("policy follows list updated with %d pubkeys", len(follows))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetPolicyAdminsBin returns a copy of the binary policy admin pubkeys.
|
|
// Used for checking if an event author is a policy admin.
|
|
func (p *P) GetPolicyAdminsBin() [][]byte {
|
|
p.followsMx.RLock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Return a copy to prevent external modification
|
|
result := make([][]byte, len(p.policyAdminsBin))
|
|
for i, admin := range p.policyAdminsBin {
|
|
adminCopy := make([]byte, len(admin))
|
|
copy(adminCopy, admin)
|
|
result[i] = adminCopy
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOwnersBin returns a copy of the binary owner pubkeys defined in the policy.
|
|
// These are merged with environment-defined owners by the application layer.
|
|
// Useful for cloud deployments where environment variables cannot be modified.
|
|
func (p *P) GetOwnersBin() [][]byte {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.followsMx.RLock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Return a copy to prevent external modification
|
|
result := make([][]byte, len(p.ownersBin))
|
|
for i, owner := range p.ownersBin {
|
|
ownerCopy := make([]byte, len(owner))
|
|
copy(ownerCopy, owner)
|
|
result[i] = ownerCopy
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOwners returns the hex-encoded owner pubkeys defined in the policy.
|
|
// These are merged with environment-defined owners by the application layer.
|
|
func (p *P) GetOwners() []string {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return p.Owners
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsPolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled returns whether the policy follow whitelist feature is enabled.
|
|
// When enabled, pubkeys followed by policy admins are automatically whitelisted for access
|
|
// when rules have WriteAllowFollows=true.
|
|
func (p *P) IsPolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled() bool {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return p.PolicyFollowWhitelistEnabled
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// FollowsWhitelistAdmins Methods
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// GetAllFollowsWhitelistAdmins returns all unique admin pubkeys from FollowsWhitelistAdmins
|
|
// across all rules (including global). Returns hex-encoded pubkeys.
|
|
// This is used at startup to validate that kind 3 events exist for these admins.
|
|
func (p *P) GetAllFollowsWhitelistAdmins() []string {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use map to deduplicate
|
|
admins := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule
|
|
for _, admin := range p.Global.FollowsWhitelistAdmins {
|
|
admins[admin] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check all kind-specific rules
|
|
for _, rule := range p.rules {
|
|
for _, admin := range rule.FollowsWhitelistAdmins {
|
|
admins[admin] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert map to slice
|
|
result := make([]string, 0, len(admins))
|
|
for admin := range admins {
|
|
result = append(result, admin)
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetRuleForKind returns the Rule for a specific kind, or nil if no rule exists.
|
|
// This allows external code to access and modify rule-specific follows whitelists.
|
|
func (p *P) GetRuleForKind(kind int) *Rule {
|
|
if p == nil || p.rules == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if rule, exists := p.rules[kind]; exists {
|
|
return &rule
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateRuleFollowsWhitelist updates the follows whitelist for a specific kind's rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateRuleFollowsWhitelist(kind int, follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil || p.rules == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
if rule, exists := p.rules[kind]; exists {
|
|
rule.UpdateFollowsWhitelist(follows)
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateGlobalFollowsWhitelist updates the follows whitelist for the global rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Note: We directly modify p.Global's unexported field because Global is a value type (not *Rule),
|
|
// so calling p.Global.UpdateFollowsWhitelist() would operate on a copy and discard changes.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateGlobalFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
p.Global.followsWhitelistFollowsBin = follows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetGlobalRule returns a pointer to the global rule for modification.
|
|
func (p *P) GetGlobalRule() *Rule {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &p.Global
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetRules returns the rules map for iteration.
|
|
// Note: Returns a copy of the map keys to prevent modification.
|
|
func (p *P) GetRulesKinds() []int {
|
|
if p == nil || p.rules == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
kinds := make([]int, 0, len(p.rules))
|
|
for kind := range p.rules {
|
|
kinds = append(kinds, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
return kinds
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// ReadFollowsWhitelist and WriteFollowsWhitelist Methods
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// GetAllReadFollowsWhitelistPubkeys returns all unique pubkeys from ReadFollowsWhitelist
|
|
// across all rules (including global). Returns hex-encoded pubkeys.
|
|
// This is used at startup to validate that kind 3 events exist for these pubkeys.
|
|
func (p *P) GetAllReadFollowsWhitelistPubkeys() []string {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use map to deduplicate
|
|
pubkeys := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule
|
|
for _, pk := range p.Global.ReadFollowsWhitelist {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check all kind-specific rules
|
|
for _, rule := range p.rules {
|
|
for _, pk := range rule.ReadFollowsWhitelist {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert map to slice
|
|
result := make([]string, 0, len(pubkeys))
|
|
for pk := range pubkeys {
|
|
result = append(result, pk)
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetAllWriteFollowsWhitelistPubkeys returns all unique pubkeys from WriteFollowsWhitelist
|
|
// across all rules (including global). Returns hex-encoded pubkeys.
|
|
// This is used at startup to validate that kind 3 events exist for these pubkeys.
|
|
func (p *P) GetAllWriteFollowsWhitelistPubkeys() []string {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use map to deduplicate
|
|
pubkeys := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule
|
|
for _, pk := range p.Global.WriteFollowsWhitelist {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check all kind-specific rules
|
|
for _, rule := range p.rules {
|
|
for _, pk := range rule.WriteFollowsWhitelist {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert map to slice
|
|
result := make([]string, 0, len(pubkeys))
|
|
for pk := range pubkeys {
|
|
result = append(result, pk)
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetAllFollowsWhitelistPubkeys returns all unique pubkeys from both ReadFollowsWhitelist
|
|
// and WriteFollowsWhitelist across all rules (including global). Returns hex-encoded pubkeys.
|
|
// This is a convenience method for startup validation to check all required kind 3 events.
|
|
func (p *P) GetAllFollowsWhitelistPubkeys() []string {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use map to deduplicate
|
|
pubkeys := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
|
|
// Get read follows whitelist pubkeys
|
|
for _, pk := range p.GetAllReadFollowsWhitelistPubkeys() {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get write follows whitelist pubkeys
|
|
for _, pk := range p.GetAllWriteFollowsWhitelistPubkeys() {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Also include deprecated FollowsWhitelistAdmins for backward compatibility
|
|
for _, pk := range p.GetAllFollowsWhitelistAdmins() {
|
|
pubkeys[pk] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert map to slice
|
|
result := make([]string, 0, len(pubkeys))
|
|
for pk := range pubkeys {
|
|
result = append(result, pk)
|
|
}
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateRuleReadFollowsWhitelist updates the read follows whitelist for a specific kind's rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateRuleReadFollowsWhitelist(kind int, follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil || p.rules == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
if rule, exists := p.rules[kind]; exists {
|
|
rule.UpdateReadFollowsWhitelist(follows)
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateRuleWriteFollowsWhitelist updates the write follows whitelist for a specific kind's rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateRuleWriteFollowsWhitelist(kind int, follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil || p.rules == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
if rule, exists := p.rules[kind]; exists {
|
|
rule.UpdateWriteFollowsWhitelist(follows)
|
|
p.rules[kind] = rule
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateGlobalReadFollowsWhitelist updates the read follows whitelist for the global rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Note: We directly modify p.Global's unexported field because Global is a value type (not *Rule),
|
|
// so calling p.Global.UpdateReadFollowsWhitelist() would operate on a copy and discard changes.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateGlobalReadFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
p.Global.readFollowsFollowsBin = follows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateGlobalWriteFollowsWhitelist updates the write follows whitelist for the global rule.
|
|
// The follows should be binary pubkeys ([]byte), not hex-encoded.
|
|
// Note: We directly modify p.Global's unexported field because Global is a value type (not *Rule),
|
|
// so calling p.Global.UpdateWriteFollowsWhitelist() would operate on a copy and discard changes.
|
|
// Thread-safe: uses followsMx to protect concurrent access.
|
|
func (p *P) UpdateGlobalWriteFollowsWhitelist(follows [][]byte) {
|
|
if p == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
p.followsMx.Lock()
|
|
defer p.followsMx.Unlock()
|
|
p.Global.writeFollowsFollowsBin = follows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Owner vs Policy Admin Update Validation
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// ValidateOwnerPolicyUpdate validates a full policy update from an owner.
|
|
// Owners can modify all fields but the owners list must be non-empty.
|
|
func (p *P) ValidateOwnerPolicyUpdate(policyJSON []byte) error {
|
|
// First run standard validation
|
|
if err := p.ValidateJSON(policyJSON); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the new policy
|
|
tempPolicy := &P{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(policyJSON, tempPolicy); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Owner-specific validation: owners list cannot be empty
|
|
if len(tempPolicy.Owners) == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("owners list cannot be empty: at least one owner must be defined to prevent lockout")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidatePolicyAdminUpdate validates a policy update from a policy admin.
|
|
// Policy admins CANNOT modify: owners, policy_admins
|
|
// Policy admins CAN: extend rules, add blacklists, add new kind rules
|
|
func (p *P) ValidatePolicyAdminUpdate(policyJSON []byte, adminPubkey []byte) error {
|
|
// First run standard validation
|
|
if err := p.ValidateJSON(policyJSON); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the new policy
|
|
tempPolicy := &P{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(policyJSON, tempPolicy); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse policy JSON: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Protected field check: owners must match current
|
|
if !stringSliceEqual(tempPolicy.Owners, p.Owners) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy admins cannot modify the 'owners' field: this is a protected field that only owners can change")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Protected field check: policy_admins must match current
|
|
if !stringSliceEqual(tempPolicy.PolicyAdmins, p.PolicyAdmins) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy admins cannot modify the 'policy_admins' field: this is a protected field that only owners can change")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate that the admin is not reducing owner-granted permissions
|
|
// This check ensures policy admins can only extend, not restrict
|
|
if err := p.validateNoPermissionReduction(tempPolicy); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy admins cannot reduce owner-granted permissions: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateNoPermissionReduction checks that the new policy doesn't reduce
|
|
// permissions that were granted in the current (owner) policy.
|
|
//
|
|
// Policy admins CAN:
|
|
// - ADD to allow lists (write_allow, read_allow)
|
|
// - ADD to deny lists (write_deny, read_deny) to blacklist non-admin users
|
|
// - INCREASE limits (size_limit, content_limit, max_age_of_event)
|
|
// - ADD new kinds to whitelist or blacklist
|
|
// - ADD new rules for kinds not defined by owner
|
|
//
|
|
// Policy admins CANNOT:
|
|
// - REMOVE from allow lists
|
|
// - DECREASE limits
|
|
// - REMOVE kinds from whitelist
|
|
// - REMOVE rules defined by owner
|
|
// - ADD new required tags (restrictions)
|
|
// - BLACKLIST owners or other policy admins
|
|
func (p *P) validateNoPermissionReduction(newPolicy *P) error {
|
|
// Check kind whitelist - new policy must include all current whitelisted kinds
|
|
for _, kind := range p.Kind.Whitelist {
|
|
found := false
|
|
for _, newKind := range newPolicy.Kind.Whitelist {
|
|
if kind == newKind {
|
|
found = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot remove kind %d from whitelist", kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check each rule in the current policy
|
|
for kind, currentRule := range p.rules {
|
|
newRule, exists := newPolicy.rules[kind]
|
|
if !exists {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot remove rule for kind %d", kind)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check write_allow - new rule must include all current pubkeys
|
|
for _, pk := range currentRule.WriteAllow {
|
|
if !containsString(newRule.WriteAllow, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot remove pubkey %s from write_allow for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check read_allow - new rule must include all current pubkeys
|
|
for _, pk := range currentRule.ReadAllow {
|
|
if !containsString(newRule.ReadAllow, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot remove pubkey %s from read_allow for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check write_deny - cannot blacklist owners or policy admins
|
|
for _, pk := range newRule.WriteDeny {
|
|
if containsString(p.Owners, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist owner %s in write_deny for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
if containsString(p.PolicyAdmins, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist policy admin %s in write_deny for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check read_deny - cannot blacklist owners or policy admins
|
|
for _, pk := range newRule.ReadDeny {
|
|
if containsString(p.Owners, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist owner %s in read_deny for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
if containsString(p.PolicyAdmins, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist policy admin %s in read_deny for kind %d", pk, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check size limits - new limit cannot be smaller
|
|
if currentRule.SizeLimit != nil && newRule.SizeLimit != nil {
|
|
if *newRule.SizeLimit < *currentRule.SizeLimit {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot reduce size_limit for kind %d from %d to %d", kind, *currentRule.SizeLimit, *newRule.SizeLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check content limits - new limit cannot be smaller
|
|
if currentRule.ContentLimit != nil && newRule.ContentLimit != nil {
|
|
if *newRule.ContentLimit < *currentRule.ContentLimit {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot reduce content_limit for kind %d from %d to %d", kind, *currentRule.ContentLimit, *newRule.ContentLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check max_age_of_event - new limit cannot be smaller (smaller = more restrictive)
|
|
if currentRule.MaxAgeOfEvent != nil && newRule.MaxAgeOfEvent != nil {
|
|
if *newRule.MaxAgeOfEvent < *currentRule.MaxAgeOfEvent {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot reduce max_age_of_event for kind %d from %d to %d", kind, *currentRule.MaxAgeOfEvent, *newRule.MaxAgeOfEvent)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check must_have_tags - cannot add new required tags (more restrictive)
|
|
for _, tag := range newRule.MustHaveTags {
|
|
found := false
|
|
for _, currentTag := range currentRule.MustHaveTags {
|
|
if tag == currentTag {
|
|
found = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !found {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot add required tag %q for kind %d (only owners can add restrictions)", tag, kind)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule write_deny - cannot blacklist owners or policy admins
|
|
for _, pk := range newPolicy.Global.WriteDeny {
|
|
if containsString(p.Owners, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist owner %s in global write_deny", pk)
|
|
}
|
|
if containsString(p.PolicyAdmins, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist policy admin %s in global write_deny", pk)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule read_deny - cannot blacklist owners or policy admins
|
|
for _, pk := range newPolicy.Global.ReadDeny {
|
|
if containsString(p.Owners, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist owner %s in global read_deny", pk)
|
|
}
|
|
if containsString(p.PolicyAdmins, pk) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot blacklist policy admin %s in global read_deny", pk)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check global rule size limits
|
|
if p.Global.SizeLimit != nil && newPolicy.Global.SizeLimit != nil {
|
|
if *newPolicy.Global.SizeLimit < *p.Global.SizeLimit {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("cannot reduce global size_limit from %d to %d", *p.Global.SizeLimit, *newPolicy.Global.SizeLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ReloadAsOwner reloads the policy from an owner's kind 12345 event.
|
|
// Owners can modify all fields but the owners list must be non-empty.
|
|
func (p *P) ReloadAsOwner(policyJSON []byte, configPath string) error {
|
|
// Validate as owner update
|
|
if err := p.ValidateOwnerPolicyUpdate(policyJSON); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("owner policy validation failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use existing Reload logic
|
|
return p.Reload(policyJSON, configPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ReloadAsPolicyAdmin reloads the policy from a policy admin's kind 12345 event.
|
|
// Policy admins cannot modify protected fields (owners, policy_admins) and
|
|
// cannot reduce owner-granted permissions.
|
|
func (p *P) ReloadAsPolicyAdmin(policyJSON []byte, configPath string, adminPubkey []byte) error {
|
|
// Validate as policy admin update
|
|
if err := p.ValidatePolicyAdminUpdate(policyJSON, adminPubkey); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("policy admin validation failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use existing Reload logic
|
|
return p.Reload(policyJSON, configPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// stringSliceEqual checks if two string slices are equal (order-independent).
|
|
func stringSliceEqual(a, b []string) bool {
|
|
if len(a) != len(b) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create maps for comparison
|
|
aMap := make(map[string]int)
|
|
for _, v := range a {
|
|
aMap[v]++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bMap := make(map[string]int)
|
|
for _, v := range b {
|
|
bMap[v]++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compare maps
|
|
for k, v := range aMap {
|
|
if bMap[k] != v {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|