Files
next.orly.dev/app/handle-event.go
mleku 880772cab1
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Remove Dgraph, check hex field case, reject if any uppercase
2025-12-03 16:26:07 +00:00

771 lines
21 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"lol.mleku.dev/chk"
"lol.mleku.dev/log"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/acl"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/envelopes/authenvelope"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/envelopes/eventenvelope"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/envelopes/noticeenvelope"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/envelopes/okenvelope"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/hex"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/kind"
"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/reason"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/protocol/nip43"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/utils"
)
// validateLowercaseHexInJSON checks that all hex-encoded fields in the raw JSON are lowercase.
// NIP-01 specifies that hex encoding must be lowercase.
// This must be called on the raw message BEFORE unmarshaling, since unmarshal converts
// hex strings to binary and loses case information.
// Returns an error message if validation fails, or empty string if valid.
func validateLowercaseHexInJSON(msg []byte) string {
// Find and validate "id" field (64 hex chars)
if err := validateJSONHexField(msg, `"id"`); err != "" {
return err + " (id)"
}
// Find and validate "pubkey" field (64 hex chars)
if err := validateJSONHexField(msg, `"pubkey"`); err != "" {
return err + " (pubkey)"
}
// Find and validate "sig" field (128 hex chars)
if err := validateJSONHexField(msg, `"sig"`); err != "" {
return err + " (sig)"
}
// Validate e and p tags in the tags array
// Tags format: ["e", "hexvalue", ...] or ["p", "hexvalue", ...]
if err := validateEPTagsInJSON(msg); err != "" {
return err
}
return "" // Valid
}
// validateJSONHexField finds a JSON field and checks if its hex value contains uppercase.
func validateJSONHexField(msg []byte, fieldName string) string {
// Find the field name
idx := bytes.Index(msg, []byte(fieldName))
if idx == -1 {
return "" // Field not found, skip
}
// Find the colon after the field name
colonIdx := bytes.Index(msg[idx:], []byte(":"))
if colonIdx == -1 {
return ""
}
// Find the opening quote of the value
valueStart := idx + colonIdx + 1
for valueStart < len(msg) && (msg[valueStart] == ' ' || msg[valueStart] == '\t' || msg[valueStart] == '\n' || msg[valueStart] == '\r') {
valueStart++
}
if valueStart >= len(msg) || msg[valueStart] != '"' {
return ""
}
valueStart++ // Skip the opening quote
// Find the closing quote
valueEnd := valueStart
for valueEnd < len(msg) && msg[valueEnd] != '"' {
valueEnd++
}
// Extract the hex value and check for uppercase
hexValue := msg[valueStart:valueEnd]
if containsUppercaseHex(hexValue) {
return "blocked: hex fields may only be lower case, see NIP-01"
}
return ""
}
// validateEPTagsInJSON checks e and p tags in the JSON for uppercase hex.
func validateEPTagsInJSON(msg []byte) string {
// Find the tags array
tagsIdx := bytes.Index(msg, []byte(`"tags"`))
if tagsIdx == -1 {
return "" // No tags
}
// Find the opening bracket of the tags array
bracketIdx := bytes.Index(msg[tagsIdx:], []byte("["))
if bracketIdx == -1 {
return ""
}
tagsStart := tagsIdx + bracketIdx
// Scan through to find ["e", ...] and ["p", ...] patterns
// This is a simplified parser that looks for specific patterns
pos := tagsStart
for pos < len(msg) {
// Look for ["e" or ["p" pattern
eTagPattern := bytes.Index(msg[pos:], []byte(`["e"`))
pTagPattern := bytes.Index(msg[pos:], []byte(`["p"`))
var tagType string
var nextIdx int
if eTagPattern == -1 && pTagPattern == -1 {
break // No more e or p tags
} else if eTagPattern == -1 {
nextIdx = pos + pTagPattern
tagType = "p"
} else if pTagPattern == -1 {
nextIdx = pos + eTagPattern
tagType = "e"
} else if eTagPattern < pTagPattern {
nextIdx = pos + eTagPattern
tagType = "e"
} else {
nextIdx = pos + pTagPattern
tagType = "p"
}
// Find the hex value after the tag type
// Pattern: ["e", "hexvalue" or ["p", "hexvalue"
commaIdx := bytes.Index(msg[nextIdx:], []byte(","))
if commaIdx == -1 {
pos = nextIdx + 4
continue
}
// Find the opening quote of the hex value
valueStart := nextIdx + commaIdx + 1
for valueStart < len(msg) && (msg[valueStart] == ' ' || msg[valueStart] == '\t' || msg[valueStart] == '"') {
if msg[valueStart] == '"' {
valueStart++
break
}
valueStart++
}
// Find the closing quote
valueEnd := valueStart
for valueEnd < len(msg) && msg[valueEnd] != '"' {
valueEnd++
}
// Check if this looks like a hex value (64 chars for pubkey/event ID)
hexValue := msg[valueStart:valueEnd]
if len(hexValue) == 64 && containsUppercaseHex(hexValue) {
return fmt.Sprintf("blocked: hex fields may only be lower case, see NIP-01 (%s tag)", tagType)
}
pos = valueEnd + 1
}
return ""
}
// containsUppercaseHex checks if a byte slice (representing hex) contains uppercase letters A-F.
func containsUppercaseHex(b []byte) bool {
for _, c := range b {
if c >= 'A' && c <= 'F' {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (l *Listener) HandleEvent(msg []byte) (err error) {
log.D.F("HandleEvent: START handling event: %s", msg)
// Validate that all hex fields are lowercase BEFORE unmarshaling
// (unmarshal converts hex to binary and loses case information)
if errMsg := validateLowercaseHexInJSON(msg); errMsg != "" {
log.W.F("HandleEvent: rejecting event with uppercase hex: %s", errMsg)
// Send NOTICE to alert client developers about the issue
if noticeErr := noticeenvelope.NewFrom(errMsg).Write(l); noticeErr != nil {
log.E.F("failed to send NOTICE for uppercase hex: %v", noticeErr)
}
// Send OK false with the error message
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
nil, false,
reason.Blocked.F(errMsg),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return nil
}
// decode the envelope
env := eventenvelope.NewSubmission()
log.I.F("HandleEvent: received event message length: %d", len(msg))
if msg, err = env.Unmarshal(msg); chk.E(err) {
log.E.F("HandleEvent: failed to unmarshal event: %v", err)
return
}
log.I.F(
"HandleEvent: successfully unmarshaled event, kind: %d, pubkey: %s, id: %0x",
env.E.Kind, hex.Enc(env.E.Pubkey), env.E.ID,
)
defer func() {
if env != nil && env.E != nil {
env.E.Free()
}
}()
if len(msg) > 0 {
log.I.F("extra '%s'", msg)
}
// Check if sprocket is enabled and process event through it
if l.sprocketManager != nil && l.sprocketManager.IsEnabled() {
if l.sprocketManager.IsDisabled() {
// Sprocket is disabled due to failure - reject all events
log.W.F("sprocket is disabled, rejecting event %0x", env.E.ID)
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env,
"sprocket disabled - events rejected until sprocket is restored",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
if !l.sprocketManager.IsRunning() {
// Sprocket is enabled but not running - reject all events
log.W.F(
"sprocket is enabled but not running, rejecting event %0x",
env.E.ID,
)
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env,
"sprocket not running - events rejected until sprocket starts",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// Process event through sprocket
response, sprocketErr := l.sprocketManager.ProcessEvent(env.E)
if chk.E(sprocketErr) {
log.E.F("sprocket processing failed: %v", sprocketErr)
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, "sprocket processing failed",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// Handle sprocket response
switch response.Action {
case "accept":
// Continue with normal processing
log.D.F("sprocket accepted event %0x", env.E.ID)
case "reject":
// Return OK false with message
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.Error.F(response.Msg),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
case "shadowReject":
// Return OK true but abort processing
if err = Ok.Ok(l, env, ""); chk.E(err) {
return
}
log.D.F("sprocket shadow rejected event %0x", env.E.ID)
return
default:
log.W.F("unknown sprocket action: %s", response.Action)
// Default to accept for unknown actions
}
}
// Check if policy is enabled and process event through it
if l.policyManager.IsEnabled() {
// Check policy for write access
allowed, policyErr := l.policyManager.CheckPolicy("write", env.E, l.authedPubkey.Load(), l.remote)
if chk.E(policyErr) {
log.E.F("policy check failed: %v", policyErr)
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, "policy check failed",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
if !allowed {
log.D.F("policy rejected event %0x", env.E.ID)
if err = Ok.Blocked(
l, env, "event blocked by policy",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
log.D.F("policy allowed event %0x", env.E.ID)
// Check ACL policy for managed ACL mode, but skip for peer relay sync events
if acl.Registry.Active.Load() == "managed" && !l.isPeerRelayPubkey(l.authedPubkey.Load()) {
allowed, aclErr := acl.Registry.CheckPolicy(env.E)
if chk.E(aclErr) {
log.E.F("ACL policy check failed: %v", aclErr)
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, "ACL policy check failed",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
if !allowed {
log.D.F("ACL policy rejected event %0x", env.E.ID)
if err = Ok.Blocked(
l, env, "event blocked by ACL policy",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
log.D.F("ACL policy allowed event %0x", env.E.ID)
}
}
// check the event ID is correct
calculatedId := env.E.GetIDBytes()
if !utils.FastEqual(calculatedId, env.E.ID) {
if err = Ok.Invalid(
l, env, "event id is computed incorrectly, "+
"event has ID %0x, but when computed it is %0x",
env.E.ID, calculatedId,
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// validate timestamp - reject events too far in the future (more than 1 hour)
now := time.Now().Unix()
if env.E.CreatedAt > now+3600 {
if err = Ok.Invalid(
l, env,
"timestamp too far in the future",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// verify the signature
var ok bool
if ok, err = env.Verify(); chk.T(err) {
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, fmt.Sprintf(
"failed to verify signature: %s",
err.Error(),
),
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
} else if !ok {
if err = Ok.Invalid(
l, env,
"signature is invalid",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// Handle NIP-43 special events before ACL checks
switch env.E.Kind {
case nip43.KindJoinRequest:
// Process join request and return early
if err = l.HandleNIP43JoinRequest(env.E); chk.E(err) {
log.E.F("failed to process NIP-43 join request: %v", err)
}
return
case nip43.KindLeaveRequest:
// Process leave request and return early
if err = l.HandleNIP43LeaveRequest(env.E); chk.E(err) {
log.E.F("failed to process NIP-43 leave request: %v", err)
}
return
case kind.PolicyConfig.K:
// Handle policy configuration update events (kind 12345)
// Only policy admins can update policy configuration
if err = l.HandlePolicyConfigUpdate(env.E); chk.E(err) {
log.E.F("failed to process policy config update: %v", err)
if err = Ok.Error(l, env, err.Error()); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// Send OK response
if err = Ok.Ok(l, env, "policy configuration updated"); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
case kind.FollowList.K:
// Check if this is a follow list update from a policy admin
// If so, refresh the policy follows cache immediately
if l.IsPolicyAdminFollowListEvent(env.E) {
// Process the follow list update (async, don't block)
go func() {
if updateErr := l.HandlePolicyAdminFollowListUpdate(env.E); updateErr != nil {
log.W.F("failed to update policy follows from admin follow list: %v", updateErr)
}
}()
}
// Continue with normal follow list processing (store the event)
}
// check permissions of user
log.I.F(
"HandleEvent: checking ACL permissions for pubkey: %s",
hex.Enc(l.authedPubkey.Load()),
)
// If ACL mode is "none" and no pubkey is set, use the event's pubkey
// But if auth is required or AuthToWrite is enabled, always use the authenticated pubkey
var pubkeyForACL []byte
if len(l.authedPubkey.Load()) == 0 && acl.Registry.Active.Load() == "none" && !l.Config.AuthRequired && !l.Config.AuthToWrite {
pubkeyForACL = env.E.Pubkey
log.I.F(
"HandleEvent: ACL mode is 'none' and auth not required, using event pubkey for ACL check: %s",
hex.Enc(pubkeyForACL),
)
} else {
pubkeyForACL = l.authedPubkey.Load()
}
// If auth is required or AuthToWrite is enabled but user is not authenticated, deny access
if (l.Config.AuthRequired || l.Config.AuthToWrite) && len(l.authedPubkey.Load()) == 0 {
log.D.F("HandleEvent: authentication required for write operations but user not authenticated")
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.AuthRequired.F("authentication required for write operations"),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
// Send AUTH challenge to prompt authentication
log.D.F("HandleEvent: sending AUTH challenge to %s", l.remote)
if err = authenvelope.NewChallengeWith(l.challenge.Load()).
Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
accessLevel := acl.Registry.GetAccessLevel(pubkeyForACL, l.remote)
log.I.F("HandleEvent: ACL access level: %s", accessLevel)
// Skip ACL check for admin/owner delete events
skipACLCheck := false
if env.E.Kind == kind.EventDeletion.K {
// Check if the delete event signer is admin or owner
for _, admin := range l.Admins {
if utils.FastEqual(admin, env.E.Pubkey) {
skipACLCheck = true
log.I.F("HandleEvent: admin delete event - skipping ACL check")
break
}
}
if !skipACLCheck {
for _, owner := range l.Owners {
if utils.FastEqual(owner, env.E.Pubkey) {
skipACLCheck = true
log.I.F("HandleEvent: owner delete event - skipping ACL check")
break
}
}
}
}
if !skipACLCheck {
switch accessLevel {
case "none":
log.D.F(
"handle event: sending 'OK,false,auth-required...' to %s",
l.remote,
)
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.AuthRequired.F("auth required for write access"),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
// return
}
log.D.F("handle event: sending challenge to %s", l.remote)
if err = authenvelope.NewChallengeWith(l.challenge.Load()).
Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
case "read":
log.D.F(
"handle event: sending 'OK,false,auth-required:...' to %s",
l.remote,
)
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.AuthRequired.F("auth required for write access"),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
log.D.F("handle event: sending challenge to %s", l.remote)
if err = authenvelope.NewChallengeWith(l.challenge.Load()).
Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
case "blocked":
log.D.F(
"handle event: sending 'OK,false,blocked...' to %s",
l.remote,
)
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.AuthRequired.F("IP address blocked"),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
case "banned":
log.D.F(
"handle event: sending 'OK,false,banned...' to %s",
l.remote,
)
if err = okenvelope.NewFrom(
env.Id(), false,
reason.AuthRequired.F("pubkey banned"),
).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
default:
// user has write access or better, continue
log.I.F("HandleEvent: user has %s access, continuing", accessLevel)
}
} else {
log.I.F("HandleEvent: skipping ACL check for admin/owner delete event")
}
// check if event is ephemeral - if so, deliver and return early
if kind.IsEphemeral(env.E.Kind) {
log.D.F("handling ephemeral event %0x (kind %d)", env.E.ID, env.E.Kind)
// Send OK response for ephemeral events
if err = Ok.Ok(l, env, ""); chk.E(err) {
return
}
// Deliver the event to subscribers immediately
clonedEvent := env.E.Clone()
go l.publishers.Deliver(clonedEvent)
log.D.F("delivered ephemeral event %0x", env.E.ID)
return
}
log.D.F("processing regular event %0x (kind %d)", env.E.ID, env.E.Kind)
// check for protected tag (NIP-70)
protectedTag := env.E.Tags.GetFirst([]byte("-"))
if protectedTag != nil && acl.Registry.Active.Load() != "none" {
// check that the pubkey of the event matches the authed pubkey
if !utils.FastEqual(l.authedPubkey.Load(), env.E.Pubkey) {
if err = Ok.Blocked(
l, env,
"protected tag may only be published by user authed to the same pubkey",
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
}
// if the event is a delete, process the delete
log.I.F(
"HandleEvent: checking if event is delete - kind: %d, EventDeletion.K: %d",
env.E.Kind, kind.EventDeletion.K,
)
if env.E.Kind == kind.EventDeletion.K {
log.I.F("processing delete event %0x", env.E.ID)
// Store the delete event itself FIRST to ensure it's available for queries
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
context.Background(), 30*time.Second,
)
defer cancel()
log.I.F(
"attempting to save delete event %0x from pubkey %0x", env.E.ID,
env.E.Pubkey,
)
log.I.F("delete event pubkey hex: %s", hex.Enc(env.E.Pubkey))
if _, err = l.DB.SaveEvent(saveCtx, env.E); err != nil {
log.E.F("failed to save delete event %0x: %v", env.E.ID, err)
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "blocked:") {
errStr := err.Error()[len("blocked: "):len(err.Error())]
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, errStr,
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
chk.E(err)
return
}
log.I.F("successfully saved delete event %0x", env.E.ID)
// Now process the deletion (remove target events)
if err = l.HandleDelete(env); err != nil {
log.E.F("HandleDelete failed for event %0x: %v", env.E.ID, err)
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "blocked:") {
errStr := err.Error()[len("blocked: "):len(err.Error())]
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, errStr,
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
// For non-blocked errors, still send OK but log the error
log.W.F("Delete processing failed but continuing: %v", err)
} else {
log.I.F(
"HandleDelete completed successfully for event %0x", env.E.ID,
)
}
// Send OK response for delete events
if err = Ok.Ok(l, env, ""); chk.E(err) {
return
}
// Deliver the delete event to subscribers
clonedEvent := env.E.Clone()
go l.publishers.Deliver(clonedEvent)
log.D.F("processed delete event %0x", env.E.ID)
return
} else {
// check if the event was deleted
// Combine admins and owners for deletion checking
adminOwners := append(l.Admins, l.Owners...)
if err = l.DB.CheckForDeleted(env.E, adminOwners); err != nil {
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "blocked:") {
errStr := err.Error()[len("blocked: "):len(err.Error())]
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, errStr,
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
}
}
}
// store the event - use a separate context to prevent cancellation issues
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
// log.I.F("saving event %0x, %s", env.E.ID, env.E.Serialize())
if _, err = l.DB.SaveEvent(saveCtx, env.E); err != nil {
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "blocked:") {
errStr := err.Error()[len("blocked: "):len(err.Error())]
if err = Ok.Error(
l, env, errStr,
); chk.E(err) {
return
}
return
}
chk.E(err)
return
}
// Handle relay group configuration events
if l.relayGroupMgr != nil {
if err := l.relayGroupMgr.ValidateRelayGroupEvent(env.E); err != nil {
log.W.F("invalid relay group config event %s: %v", hex.Enc(env.E.ID), err)
}
// Process the event and potentially update peer lists
if l.syncManager != nil {
l.relayGroupMgr.HandleRelayGroupEvent(env.E, l.syncManager)
}
}
// Handle cluster membership events (Kind 39108)
if env.E.Kind == 39108 && l.clusterManager != nil {
if err := l.clusterManager.HandleMembershipEvent(env.E); err != nil {
log.W.F("invalid cluster membership event %s: %v", hex.Enc(env.E.ID), err)
}
}
// Update serial for distributed synchronization
if l.syncManager != nil {
l.syncManager.UpdateSerial()
log.D.F("updated serial for event %s", hex.Enc(env.E.ID))
}
// Send a success response storing
if err = Ok.Ok(l, env, ""); chk.E(err) {
return
}
// Deliver the event to subscribers immediately after sending OK response
// Clone the event to prevent corruption when the original is freed
clonedEvent := env.E.Clone()
go l.publishers.Deliver(clonedEvent)
log.D.F("saved event %0x", env.E.ID)
var isNewFromAdmin bool
// Check if event is from admin or owner
for _, admin := range l.Admins {
if utils.FastEqual(admin, env.E.Pubkey) {
isNewFromAdmin = true
break
}
}
if !isNewFromAdmin {
for _, owner := range l.Owners {
if utils.FastEqual(owner, env.E.Pubkey) {
isNewFromAdmin = true
break
}
}
}
if isNewFromAdmin {
log.I.F("new event from admin %0x", env.E.Pubkey)
// if a follow list was saved, reconfigure ACLs now that it is persisted
if env.E.Kind == kind.FollowList.K ||
env.E.Kind == kind.RelayListMetadata.K {
// Run ACL reconfiguration asynchronously to prevent blocking websocket operations
go func() {
if err := acl.Registry.Configure(); chk.E(err) {
log.E.F("failed to reconfigure ACL: %v", err)
}
}()
}
}
return
}
// isPeerRelayPubkey checks if the given pubkey belongs to a peer relay
func (l *Listener) isPeerRelayPubkey(pubkey []byte) bool {
if l.syncManager == nil {
return false
}
peerPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(pubkey)
// Check if this pubkey matches any of our configured peer relays' NIP-11 pubkeys
for _, peerURL := range l.syncManager.GetPeers() {
if l.syncManager.IsAuthorizedPeer(peerURL, peerPubkeyHex) {
return true
}
}
return false
}