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next.orly.dev/app/handle-count.go
mleku 88d3e3f73e
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Refactor authentication challenge logic in HandleCount and HandleReq
- Updated the authentication challenge conditions in both HandleCount and HandleReq functions to check for the presence of an authenticated public key.
- Introduced the schnorr package to handle public key length validation.
- Bumped version to v0.25.7 to reflect these changes.
2025-11-05 19:23:59 +00:00

101 lines
3.1 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"lol.mleku.dev/chk"
"lol.mleku.dev/log"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/acl"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/crypto/ec/schnorr"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/encoders/envelopes/authenvelope"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/encoders/envelopes/countenvelope"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/utils/normalize"
)
// HandleCount processes a COUNT envelope by parsing the request, verifying
// permissions, invoking the database CountEvents for each provided filter, and
// responding with a COUNT response containing the aggregate count.
func (l *Listener) HandleCount(msg []byte) (err error) {
log.D.F("HandleCount: START processing from %s", l.remote)
// Parse the COUNT request
env := countenvelope.New()
if _, err = env.Unmarshal(msg); chk.E(err) {
return normalize.Error.Errorf(err.Error())
}
log.D.C(func() string { return fmt.Sprintf("COUNT sub=%s filters=%d", env.Subscription, len(env.Filters)) })
// If ACL is active, auth is required, or AuthToWrite is enabled, send a challenge (same as REQ path)
if len(l.authedPubkey.Load()) != schnorr.PubKeyBytesLen && (acl.Registry.Active.Load() != "none" || l.Config.AuthRequired || l.Config.AuthToWrite) {
if err = authenvelope.NewChallengeWith(l.challenge.Load()).Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
}
// Check read permissions
accessLevel := acl.Registry.GetAccessLevel(l.authedPubkey.Load(), l.remote)
// If auth is required but user is not authenticated, deny access
if l.Config.AuthRequired && len(l.authedPubkey.Load()) == 0 {
return errors.New("authentication required")
}
// If AuthToWrite is enabled, allow COUNT without auth (but still check ACL)
if l.Config.AuthToWrite && len(l.authedPubkey.Load()) == 0 {
// Allow unauthenticated COUNT when AuthToWrite is enabled
// but still respect ACL access levels if ACL is active
if acl.Registry.Active.Load() != "none" {
switch accessLevel {
case "none", "blocked", "banned":
return errors.New("auth required: user not authed or has no read access")
}
}
// Allow the request to proceed without authentication
} else {
// Only check ACL access level if not already handled by AuthToWrite
switch accessLevel {
case "none":
return errors.New("auth required: user not authed or has no read access")
default:
// allowed to read
}
}
// Use a bounded context for counting, isolated from the connection context
// to prevent count timeouts from affecting the long-lived websocket connection
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
// Aggregate count across all provided filters
var total int
var approx bool // database returns false per implementation
for _, f := range env.Filters {
if f == nil {
continue
}
var cnt int
var a bool
cnt, a, err = l.D.CountEvents(ctx, f)
if chk.E(err) {
return
}
total += cnt
approx = approx || a
}
// Build and send COUNT response
var res *countenvelope.Response
if res, err = countenvelope.NewResponseFrom(env.Subscription, total, approx); chk.E(err) {
return
}
if err = res.Write(l); chk.E(err) {
return
}
log.D.F("HandleCount: COMPLETED processing from %s count=%d approx=%v", l.remote, total, approx)
return nil
}