implement auth, closed and close envelopes

This commit is contained in:
2025-08-30 13:21:06 +01:00
parent 1ba2bb0a9b
commit acee5e3a90
23 changed files with 1186 additions and 44 deletions

126
pkg/protocol/auth/nip42.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
package auth
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"lol.mleku.dev/chk"
"lol.mleku.dev/errorf"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/encoders/event"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/encoders/kind"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/encoders/tag"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/utils"
)
// GenerateChallenge creates a reasonable, 16-byte base64 challenge string
func GenerateChallenge() (b []byte) {
bb := make([]byte, 12)
b = make([]byte, 16)
_, _ = rand.Read(bb)
base64.URLEncoding.Encode(b, bb)
return
}
// CreateUnsigned creates an event which should be sent via an "AUTH" command.
// If the authentication succeeds, the user will be authenticated as a pubkey.
func CreateUnsigned(pubkey, challenge []byte, relayURL string) (ev *event.E) {
return &event.E{
Pubkey: pubkey,
CreatedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
Kind: kind.ClientAuthentication.K,
Tags: tag.NewS(
tag.New("relay", relayURL),
tag.New("challenge", string(challenge)),
),
}
}
// helper function for ValidateAuthEvent.
func parseURL(input string) (*url.URL, error) {
return url.Parse(
strings.ToLower(
strings.TrimSuffix(input, "/"),
),
)
}
var (
// ChallengeTag is the tag for the challenge in a NIP-42 auth event
// (prevents relay attacks).
ChallengeTag = []byte("challenge")
// RelayTag is the relay tag for a NIP-42 auth event (prevents cross-server
// attacks).
RelayTag = []byte("relay")
)
// Validate checks whether an event is a valid NIP-42 event for a given
// challenge and relayURL. The result of the validation is encoded in the ok
// bool.
func Validate(evt *event.E, challenge []byte, relayURL string) (
ok bool, err error,
) {
if evt.Kind != kind.ClientAuthentication.K {
err = errorf.E(
"event incorrect kind for auth: %d %s",
evt.Kind, kind.GetString(evt.Kind),
)
return
}
if evt.Tags.GetFirst(ChallengeTag) == nil {
err = errorf.E("challenge tag missing from auth response")
return
}
if !utils.FastEqual(challenge, evt.Tags.GetFirst(ChallengeTag).Value()) {
err = errorf.E("challenge tag incorrect from auth response")
return
}
var expected, found *url.URL
if expected, err = parseURL(relayURL); chk.D(err) {
return
}
r := evt.Tags.
GetFirst(RelayTag).Value()
if len(r) == 0 {
err = errorf.E("relay tag missing from auth response")
return
}
if found, err = parseURL(string(r)); chk.D(err) {
err = errorf.E("error parsing relay url: %s", err)
return
}
if expected.Scheme != found.Scheme {
err = errorf.E(
"HTTP Scheme incorrect: expected '%s' got '%s",
expected.Scheme, found.Scheme,
)
return
}
if expected.Host != found.Host {
err = errorf.E(
"HTTP Host incorrect: expected '%s' got '%s",
expected.Host, found.Host,
)
return
}
if expected.Path != found.Path {
err = errorf.E(
"HTTP Path incorrect: expected '%s' got '%s",
expected.Path, found.Path,
)
return
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
ca := evt.CreatedAt
if ca > now+10*60 || ca < now-10*60 {
err = errorf.E(
"auth event more than 10 minutes before or after current time",
)
return
}
// save for last, as it is the most expensive operation
return evt.Verify()
}

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package auth
import (
"testing"
"lol.mleku.dev/chk"
"lol.mleku.dev/log"
"next.orly.dev/pkg/crypto/p256k"
)
func TestCreateUnsigned(t *testing.T) {
var err error
signer := new(p256k.Signer)
if err = signer.Generate(); chk.E(err) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var ok bool
const relayURL = "wss://example.com"
for range 100 {
challenge := GenerateChallenge()
ev := CreateUnsigned(signer.Pub(), challenge, relayURL)
if err = ev.Sign(signer); chk.E(err) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
log.I.S(ev)
if ok, err = Validate(ev, challenge, relayURL); chk.E(err) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !ok {
bb := ev.Marshal(nil)
t.Fatalf("failed to validate auth event\n%s", bb)
}
}
}