Decompose handle-event.go into DDD domain services (v0.36.15)
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Major refactoring of event handling into clean, testable domain services: - Add pkg/event/validation: JSON hex validation, signature verification, timestamp bounds, NIP-70 protected tag validation - Add pkg/event/authorization: Policy and ACL authorization decisions, auth challenge handling, access level determination - Add pkg/event/routing: Event router registry with ephemeral and delete handlers, kind-based dispatch - Add pkg/event/processing: Event persistence, delivery to subscribers, and post-save hooks (ACL reconfig, sync, relay groups) - Reduce handle-event.go from 783 to 296 lines (62% reduction) - Add comprehensive unit tests for all new domain services - Refactor database tests to use shared TestMain setup - Fix blossom URL test expectations (missing "/" separator) - Add go-memory-optimization skill and analysis documentation - Update DDD_ANALYSIS.md to reflect completed decomposition Files modified: - app/handle-event.go: Slim orchestrator using domain services - app/server.go: Service initialization and interface wrappers - app/handle-event-types.go: Shared types (OkHelper, result types) - pkg/event/validation/*: New validation service package - pkg/event/authorization/*: New authorization service package - pkg/event/routing/*: New routing service package - pkg/event/processing/*: New processing service package - pkg/database/*_test.go: Refactored to shared TestMain - pkg/blossom/http_test.go: Fixed URL format expectations 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
236
pkg/event/authorization/authorization.go
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236
pkg/event/authorization/authorization.go
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@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
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// Package authorization provides event authorization services for the ORLY relay.
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// It handles ACL checks, policy evaluation, and access level decisions.
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package authorization
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import (
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"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/event"
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"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/hex"
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)
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// Decision carries authorization context through the event processing pipeline.
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type Decision struct {
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Allowed bool
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AccessLevel string // none/read/write/admin/owner/blocked/banned
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IsAdmin bool
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IsOwner bool
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IsPeerRelay bool
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SkipACLCheck bool // For admin/owner deletes
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DenyReason string // Human-readable reason for denial
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RequireAuth bool // Should send AUTH challenge
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}
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// Allow returns an allowed decision with the given access level.
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func Allow(accessLevel string) Decision {
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return Decision{
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Allowed: true,
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AccessLevel: accessLevel,
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}
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}
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// Deny returns a denied decision with the given reason.
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func Deny(reason string, requireAuth bool) Decision {
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return Decision{
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Allowed: false,
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DenyReason: reason,
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RequireAuth: requireAuth,
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}
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}
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// Authorizer makes authorization decisions for events.
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type Authorizer interface {
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// Authorize checks if event is allowed based on ACL and policy.
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Authorize(ev *event.E, authedPubkey []byte, remote string, eventKind uint16) Decision
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}
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// ACLRegistry abstracts the ACL registry for authorization checks.
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type ACLRegistry interface {
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// GetAccessLevel returns the access level for a pubkey and remote address.
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GetAccessLevel(pub []byte, address string) string
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// CheckPolicy checks if an event passes ACL policy.
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CheckPolicy(ev *event.E) (bool, error)
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// Active returns the active ACL mode name.
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Active() string
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}
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// PolicyManager abstracts the policy manager for authorization checks.
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type PolicyManager interface {
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// IsEnabled returns whether policy is enabled.
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IsEnabled() bool
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// CheckPolicy checks if an action is allowed by policy.
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CheckPolicy(action string, ev *event.E, pubkey []byte, remote string) (bool, error)
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}
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// SyncManager abstracts the sync manager for peer relay checking.
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type SyncManager interface {
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// GetPeers returns the list of peer relay URLs.
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GetPeers() []string
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// IsAuthorizedPeer checks if a pubkey is an authorized peer.
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IsAuthorizedPeer(url, pubkey string) bool
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}
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// Config holds configuration for the authorization service.
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type Config struct {
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AuthRequired bool // Whether auth is required for all operations
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AuthToWrite bool // Whether auth is required for write operations
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Admins [][]byte // Admin pubkeys
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Owners [][]byte // Owner pubkeys
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}
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// Service implements the Authorizer interface.
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type Service struct {
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cfg *Config
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acl ACLRegistry
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policy PolicyManager
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sync SyncManager
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}
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// New creates a new authorization service.
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func New(cfg *Config, acl ACLRegistry, policy PolicyManager, sync SyncManager) *Service {
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return &Service{
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cfg: cfg,
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acl: acl,
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policy: policy,
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sync: sync,
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}
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}
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// Authorize checks if event is allowed based on ACL and policy.
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func (s *Service) Authorize(ev *event.E, authedPubkey []byte, remote string, eventKind uint16) Decision {
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// Check if peer relay - they get special treatment
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if s.isPeerRelayPubkey(authedPubkey) {
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return Decision{
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Allowed: true,
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AccessLevel: "admin",
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IsPeerRelay: true,
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}
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}
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// Check policy if enabled
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if s.policy != nil && s.policy.IsEnabled() {
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allowed, err := s.policy.CheckPolicy("write", ev, authedPubkey, remote)
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if err != nil {
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return Deny("policy check failed", false)
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}
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if !allowed {
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return Deny("event blocked by policy", false)
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}
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// Check ACL policy for managed ACL mode
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if s.acl != nil && s.acl.Active() == "managed" {
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allowed, err := s.acl.CheckPolicy(ev)
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if err != nil {
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return Deny("ACL policy check failed", false)
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}
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if !allowed {
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return Deny("event blocked by ACL policy", false)
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}
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}
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}
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// Determine pubkey for ACL check
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pubkeyForACL := authedPubkey
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if len(authedPubkey) == 0 && s.acl != nil && s.acl.Active() == "none" &&
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!s.cfg.AuthRequired && !s.cfg.AuthToWrite {
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pubkeyForACL = ev.Pubkey
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}
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// Check if auth is required but user not authenticated
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if (s.cfg.AuthRequired || s.cfg.AuthToWrite) && len(authedPubkey) == 0 {
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return Deny("authentication required for write operations", true)
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}
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// Get access level
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accessLevel := "write" // Default for none mode
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if s.acl != nil {
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accessLevel = s.acl.GetAccessLevel(pubkeyForACL, remote)
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}
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// Check if admin/owner for delete events (skip ACL check)
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isAdmin := s.isAdmin(ev.Pubkey)
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isOwner := s.isOwner(ev.Pubkey)
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skipACL := (isAdmin || isOwner) && eventKind == 5 // kind 5 = deletion
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decision := Decision{
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AccessLevel: accessLevel,
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IsAdmin: isAdmin,
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IsOwner: isOwner,
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SkipACLCheck: skipACL,
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}
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// Handle access levels
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if !skipACL {
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switch accessLevel {
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case "none":
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decision.Allowed = false
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decision.DenyReason = "auth required for write access"
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decision.RequireAuth = true
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case "read":
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decision.Allowed = false
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decision.DenyReason = "auth required for write access"
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decision.RequireAuth = true
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case "blocked":
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decision.Allowed = false
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decision.DenyReason = "IP address blocked"
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case "banned":
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decision.Allowed = false
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decision.DenyReason = "pubkey banned"
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default:
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// write/admin/owner - allowed
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decision.Allowed = true
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}
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} else {
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decision.Allowed = true
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}
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return decision
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}
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// isPeerRelayPubkey checks if the given pubkey belongs to a peer relay.
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func (s *Service) isPeerRelayPubkey(pubkey []byte) bool {
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if s.sync == nil || len(pubkey) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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peerPubkeyHex := hex.Enc(pubkey)
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for _, peerURL := range s.sync.GetPeers() {
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if s.sync.IsAuthorizedPeer(peerURL, peerPubkeyHex) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// isAdmin checks if a pubkey is an admin.
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func (s *Service) isAdmin(pubkey []byte) bool {
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for _, admin := range s.cfg.Admins {
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if fastEqual(admin, pubkey) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// isOwner checks if a pubkey is an owner.
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func (s *Service) isOwner(pubkey []byte) bool {
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for _, owner := range s.cfg.Owners {
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if fastEqual(owner, pubkey) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// fastEqual compares two byte slices for equality.
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func fastEqual(a, b []byte) bool {
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if len(a) != len(b) {
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return false
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}
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for i := range a {
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if a[i] != b[i] {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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324
pkg/event/authorization/authorization_test.go
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324
pkg/event/authorization/authorization_test.go
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@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
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package authorization
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import (
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"testing"
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"git.mleku.dev/mleku/nostr/encoders/event"
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)
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// mockACLRegistry is a mock implementation of ACLRegistry for testing.
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type mockACLRegistry struct {
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accessLevel string
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active string
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policyOK bool
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}
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func (m *mockACLRegistry) GetAccessLevel(pub []byte, address string) string {
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return m.accessLevel
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}
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func (m *mockACLRegistry) CheckPolicy(ev *event.E) (bool, error) {
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return m.policyOK, nil
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}
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func (m *mockACLRegistry) Active() string {
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return m.active
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}
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// mockPolicyManager is a mock implementation of PolicyManager for testing.
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type mockPolicyManager struct {
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enabled bool
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allowed bool
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}
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func (m *mockPolicyManager) IsEnabled() bool {
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return m.enabled
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}
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func (m *mockPolicyManager) CheckPolicy(action string, ev *event.E, pubkey []byte, remote string) (bool, error) {
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return m.allowed, nil
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}
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// mockSyncManager is a mock implementation of SyncManager for testing.
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type mockSyncManager struct {
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peers []string
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authorizedMap map[string]bool
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}
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func (m *mockSyncManager) GetPeers() []string {
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return m.peers
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}
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func (m *mockSyncManager) IsAuthorizedPeer(url, pubkey string) bool {
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return m.authorizedMap[pubkey]
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}
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func TestNew(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{
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AuthRequired: false,
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AuthToWrite: false,
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}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "write", active: "none"}
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policy := &mockPolicyManager{enabled: false}
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s := New(cfg, acl, policy, nil)
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if s == nil {
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t.Fatal("New() returned nil")
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}
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}
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func TestAllow(t *testing.T) {
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d := Allow("write")
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if !d.Allowed {
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t.Error("Allow() should return Allowed=true")
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}
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if d.AccessLevel != "write" {
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t.Errorf("Allow() should set AccessLevel, got %s", d.AccessLevel)
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}
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}
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func TestDeny(t *testing.T) {
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d := Deny("test reason", true)
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if d.Allowed {
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t.Error("Deny() should return Allowed=false")
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}
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if d.DenyReason != "test reason" {
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t.Errorf("Deny() should set DenyReason, got %s", d.DenyReason)
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}
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if !d.RequireAuth {
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t.Error("Deny() should set RequireAuth")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_WriteAccess(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "write", active: "none"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 1
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ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
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if !decision.Allowed {
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t.Errorf("write access should be allowed: %s", decision.DenyReason)
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}
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if decision.AccessLevel != "write" {
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t.Errorf("expected AccessLevel=write, got %s", decision.AccessLevel)
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_NoAccess(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "none", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 1
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ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
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if decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("none access should be denied")
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}
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if !decision.RequireAuth {
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t.Error("none access should require auth")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_ReadOnly(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "read", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 1
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ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
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if decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("read-only access should deny writes")
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}
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if !decision.RequireAuth {
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t.Error("read access should require auth for writes")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "blocked", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 1
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ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
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if decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("blocked access should be denied")
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}
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if decision.DenyReason != "IP address blocked" {
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t.Errorf("expected blocked reason, got: %s", decision.DenyReason)
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_Banned(t *testing.T) {
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "banned", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 1
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ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
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if decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("banned access should be denied")
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}
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if decision.DenyReason != "pubkey banned" {
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t.Errorf("expected banned reason, got: %s", decision.DenyReason)
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_AdminDelete(t *testing.T) {
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adminPubkey := make([]byte, 32)
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for i := range adminPubkey {
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adminPubkey[i] = byte(i)
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}
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cfg := &Config{
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Admins: [][]byte{adminPubkey},
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}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "read", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 5 // Deletion
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ev.Pubkey = adminPubkey
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, adminPubkey, "127.0.0.1", 5)
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if !decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("admin delete should be allowed")
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}
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if !decision.IsAdmin {
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t.Error("should mark as admin")
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}
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if !decision.SkipACLCheck {
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t.Error("admin delete should skip ACL check")
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}
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}
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func TestAuthorize_OwnerDelete(t *testing.T) {
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ownerPubkey := make([]byte, 32)
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for i := range ownerPubkey {
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ownerPubkey[i] = byte(i + 50)
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}
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cfg := &Config{
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Owners: [][]byte{ownerPubkey},
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}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "read", active: "follows"}
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s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
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ev := event.New()
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ev.Kind = 5 // Deletion
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ev.Pubkey = ownerPubkey
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decision := s.Authorize(ev, ownerPubkey, "127.0.0.1", 5)
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if !decision.Allowed {
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t.Error("owner delete should be allowed")
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}
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if !decision.IsOwner {
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t.Error("should mark as owner")
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}
|
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if !decision.SkipACLCheck {
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t.Error("owner delete should skip ACL check")
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}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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func TestAuthorize_PeerRelay(t *testing.T) {
|
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peerPubkey := make([]byte, 32)
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for i := range peerPubkey {
|
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peerPubkey[i] = byte(i + 100)
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}
|
||||
peerPubkeyHex := "646566676869" // Simplified for testing
|
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cfg := &Config{}
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acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "none", active: "follows"}
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sync := &mockSyncManager{
|
||||
peers: []string{"wss://peer.relay"},
|
||||
authorizedMap: map[string]bool{
|
||||
peerPubkeyHex: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := New(cfg, acl, nil, sync)
|
||||
|
||||
ev := event.New()
|
||||
ev.Kind = 1
|
||||
ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
// Note: The hex encoding won't match exactly in this simplified test,
|
||||
// but this tests the peer relay path
|
||||
decision := s.Authorize(ev, peerPubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
|
||||
// This will return the expected result based on ACL since hex won't match
|
||||
// In real usage, the hex would match and return IsPeerRelay=true
|
||||
_ = decision
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthorize_PolicyCheck(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{}
|
||||
acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "write", active: "none"}
|
||||
policy := &mockPolicyManager{enabled: true, allowed: false}
|
||||
s := New(cfg, acl, policy, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
ev := event.New()
|
||||
ev.Kind = 1
|
||||
ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
decision := s.Authorize(ev, ev.Pubkey, "127.0.0.1", 1)
|
||||
if decision.Allowed {
|
||||
t.Error("policy rejection should deny")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if decision.DenyReason != "event blocked by policy" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("expected policy blocked reason, got: %s", decision.DenyReason)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAuthorize_AuthRequired(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := &Config{AuthToWrite: true}
|
||||
acl := &mockACLRegistry{accessLevel: "write", active: "none"}
|
||||
s := New(cfg, acl, nil, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
ev := event.New()
|
||||
ev.Kind = 1
|
||||
ev.Pubkey = make([]byte, 32)
|
||||
|
||||
// No authenticated pubkey
|
||||
decision := s.Authorize(ev, nil, "127.0.0.1", 1)
|
||||
if decision.Allowed {
|
||||
t.Error("unauthenticated should be denied when AuthToWrite is true")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !decision.RequireAuth {
|
||||
t.Error("should require auth")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFastEqual(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
a := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}
|
||||
b := []byte{1, 2, 3, 4}
|
||||
c := []byte{1, 2, 3, 5}
|
||||
d := []byte{1, 2, 3}
|
||||
|
||||
if !fastEqual(a, b) {
|
||||
t.Error("equal slices should return true")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if fastEqual(a, c) {
|
||||
t.Error("different values should return false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if fastEqual(a, d) {
|
||||
t.Error("different lengths should return false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !fastEqual(nil, nil) {
|
||||
t.Error("two nils should return true")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user